Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 41
Number 2 Special Education in Urban Schools: Ideas
for a Changing Landscape

Article 6

March 2016

A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions
Cement Second-Class Remedial Scheme for LowIncome Children with Disabilities in the Third
Circuit
Jennifer Rosen Valverde
Rutgers University School of Law -- Newark

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Education Law Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Cement Second-Class Remedial Scheme for Low-Income Children
with Disabilities in the Third Circuit, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 599 (2013).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol41/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

A POOR IDEA: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DECISIONS CEMENT SECOND-CLASS
REMEDIAL SCHEME FOR LOW-INCOME
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
Jennifer Rosen Valverde*
Introduction .............................................................................................600
I. Identifying the Affected Population: The Relationship
Between Socioeconomic Status, Disability, and Educational
Outcomes ...........................................................................................605
A. The Links Between Socioeconomic Status, Child
Development, and Educational Outcomes ........................608
B. The Link Between Socioeconomic Status and
Disability ................................................................................612
C. The Link between Disability and Educational
Outcomes ...............................................................................615
D. The Intersection of Socioeconomic Status, Disability,
and Educational Outcomes ..................................................617
II. Overview of the IDEA’s Remedial Scheme ................................624
A. Tuition Reimbursement .......................................................626
B. Compensatory Education.....................................................627
III. Application of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of Limitations to
Compensatory Education Claims in the Third Circuit .................631
A. Timelines for Filing Special Education Claims PreIDEA 2004 .............................................................................631

*

Jennifer Rosen Valverde, Esq., MSW, is a Clinical Professor of Law in the
Education and Health Law Clinic (formerly known as the Special Education Clinic)
at the Rutgers University School of Law-Newark. I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to my colleagues at Rutgers and other institutions, as well as practitioners in
the field of special education law for whom I have great respect, for their time,
careful reading of, and thoughtful comments on drafts of this Article, including
Esther Canty-Barnes, Debra Chopp, Stuart Deutsch, Rachel Elkin, David Giles,
Rebecca Spar, and Arsen Zartarian. I also owe a huge thank you to law librarian
Susan Lyons, research assistants Joseph Cambell, Ashley Morin, and David Ulric,
and administrative assistant Gina Davila.

599

600

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. 41

B. Courts’ Misapplication and Overly Restrictive
Interpretation of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of
Limitations and its Exceptions in Compensatory
Education Matters ................................................................635
1. Application of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of
Limitations .......................................................................637
a. Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of
Compensatory Education Claims to Two Years
Prior to the Date the Complaint Was Filed ...........638
b. Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of
Compensatory Education Claims to Two Years
Prior to the KOSHK Date Regardless of the
Scope of the Claim ....................................................640
2. Application of Equitable Tolling to the IDEA
following the 2004 Amendments ...................................649
3. The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Exceptions to
the Statute of Limitations ...............................................652
IV. Application of Third Circuit Courts’ Opinions to Case
Studies ................................................................................................653
A. The Case of Aaron ................................................................654
B. The Case of Asia ...................................................................658
V. Remedying Inequalities in the Remedial Scheme.........................662
Conclusion ................................................................................................668

INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, or the
Act), enacted in 1975 as the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA),1 was widely praised as landmark civil rights
legislation providing equality in educational opportunity to children
with disabilities.2 For decades preceding the law’s passage, school
districts routinely denied children with disabilities an adequate

1. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
2. Under the IDEA, and for purposes of this Article, a ‘‘child with a disability’’ is
defined as a child ‘‘(i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness),
serious emotional disturbance, . . . orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain
injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by
reason thereof, needs special education and related services.’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)
(2012); see Debra Chopp, School Districts and Families Under the IDEA:
Collaborative in Theory, Adversarial in Fact, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
423, 426---29 (2012) (discussing the history behind the enactment of the EAHCA).
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education.3
They provided no educational assistance or
accommodations to children in school, ‘‘warehoused’’ children in
institutions thereby segregating them from their non-disabled peers,
or excluded them from school altogether.4
In the years following the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,5 individual and class action
lawsuits across the country challenged the exclusion of students with
disabilities from school on equal protection and other grounds.6 Two
seminal federal district court decisions, Pennsylvania Ass’n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania and Mills v. Board of Education,
significantly transformed the education landscape by granting
children with disabilities access to an adequate, publicly supported
education, and by instituting due process and procedural protections
for parents and children.7 Plaintiffs in these cases successfully argued
for extension of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Brown to schoolage children with disabilities who were denied proper educational
programs and services, specifically that ‘‘separate but equal’’ is
‘‘inherently unequal’’ and that education ‘‘is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.’’8 The end result was the
promulgation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act,
now known as the IDEA.
Nearly forty years later, tremendous progress has been made both
in educating children with disabilities and in safeguarding their right
to an appropriate education.9 Yet, despite the myriad of benefits
stemming from its aim to create equality in educational opportunity

3. See S. REP. NO. 104-275, at 6 (1996) (stating that prior to the enactment of the
EAHCA, approximately one million children were excluded from attending public
schools and four million children did not receive any educational services); see also
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2012) (noting that ‘‘the educational needs of millions of
children’’ were not being met).
4. See S. REP. NO. 104-275 (1996).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See, e.g., Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257,
1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (holding that the Washington, D.C. public school system cannot exclude
children with disabilities from regular education programs unless they are provided
with adequate alternative services and due process protections); Pa. Ass’n for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 302---03 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(enjoining the state from denying children with disabilities access to a free and
appropriate program of education).
7. See supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 874---75 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954)).
9. See generally H.R. Con. Res. 329, 111th Cong. (2010) (enumerating the
successes of the IDEA).
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for children with disabilities, the IDEA has inadvertently advanced
inequality on the ground of socioeconomic status.10 Children living in
poverty have higher rates of disability11 and poorer educational
outcomes than their middle and upper class peers.12 While the IDEA
provides a detailed framework of special education rights for parents
and their children with disabilities,13 low-income parents’ ability to
enforce those rights successfully is, at best, a challenge and, at worst,
an impossible feat.14 Adding insult to injury, on the occasions that
parents succeed in their enforcement efforts, remedies available
under the IDEA often do not compensate low-income children
adequately for the harms that occurred and potential lifelong
consequences that ensue.15 The failure to properly educate children
with disabilities results in dramatic costs not only to the children
affected and their families, but also to society.16
10. This Article focuses on inequality under the IDEA stemming from socioeconomic status only. For more information on race-based inequalities under the
IDEA, see, e.g., N.J. COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, STILL SEPARATE
AND UNEQUAL: THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN NEW JERSEY
18---20 (2004), available at http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/issues-specialeducation/Still_Separate_and_Unequal.pdf
(discussing,
in
part,
the
overrepresentation of minority students in segregated special education settings);
Carla O’Connor & Sonia D. Fernandez, Race, Class, and Disproportionality:
Reevaluating the Relationship Between Poverty and Special Education Placement,
35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 6 (2006) (arguing that school culture and organization place
minority youth at risk for special education placement by perceiving them as
academically and behaviorally deficient).
11. See MARY WAGNER ET AL., THE CHILDREN WE SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 47 (2002), available at http://www.seels.net/
designdocs/SEELS_Children_We_Serve_Report.pdf; see also Patricia A. Massey &
Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: Toward a Law School Clinical Model for
Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 271, 281 (2005)
(noting that low-income families are fifty percent more likely to have a child with a
disability than higher income families).
12. See generally Patrice L. Engle & Maureen M. Black, The Effect of Poverty on
Child Development and Educational Outcomes, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 243
(2008); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the links among socioeconomic status, child
development and educational outcomes).
13. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400---1482 (2012).
14. This statement is based on the author’s personal experience representing lowincome parents of children with disabilities in special education matters.
15. See generally infra Part I.
16. See HARRY J. HOLZER ET AL., THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF POVERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES: SUBSEQUENT EFFECTS OF CHILDREN GROWING UP POOR 1 (2007),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/01/pdf/
poverty_report.pdf (estimating that child and youth poverty cost the country $500
billion per year in lower economic output, increased health costs, and greater
criminal justice costs); see also HARRY J. HOLZER, PENNY WISE, POUND FOOLISH:
WHY TACKLING CHILD POVERTY DURING THE GREAT RECESSION MAKES ECONOMIC
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The Third Circuit, once considered a progressive and favorable
bastion for parents and children in the special education arena,17 more
recently has joined the ‘‘pro-school’’ movement,18 eroding the special

SENSE 4 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2010/09/pdf/hit_childpoverty.pdf; LYNN A. KAROLY, ET AL., EARLY
CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS: PROVEN RESULTS, FUTURE PROMISE, at xxv (2005),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_
MG341.pdf (finding a rate of return on investment of $1.26 to $17.07 for every dollar
spent on early childhood intervention, with the greatest cost-benefit ratios associated
with programs that engage in longer-term follow-up); Engle & Black, supra, note 12,
at 244 (noting that low-income students are at higher risk of not graduating from high
school, resulting in a sixteen percent reduction in earnings from 1975---2005); Michael
Lipkin, Evaluating Universal Preschool, CHI. TONIGHT (Mar. 19, 2013),
http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2013/03/19/evaluating-universal-preschool
(quoting
Nobel Prize winning economist, James Heckman, stating that children who
participated in the Perry Preschool Project had a rate of return on investment of ‘‘7 to
10 percent per annum for each dollar invested,’’ beating the stock market).
17. The Third Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to use the ‘‘meaningful
benefit standard’’ exclusively in defining a free and appropriate public education, and
the only one that requires a student’s Individualized Education Program, the vehicle
for delivering an appropriate education to a student with a disability, to provide
significant learning. See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Rowley Standard: A Circuit by
Circuit Review of How Rowley Has Been Interpreted, 247 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1,
17 (2009); see also Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education Under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position,
110 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 881 n.18 (2006). Additionally, for many years the Third
Circuit was among the minority of courts that authorized monetary damages as a
viable remedy for IDEA violations through § 1983 enforcement of the IDEA. The
Circuit was also among the few venues that left open the possibility of obtaining
monetary damages directly under the IDEA. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v.
N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252---53 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming the right to bring
claims for monetary damages in special education matters under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and § 1983); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding monetary damages are available in special education matters brought
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and § 1983). But see A.W. v.
Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding Congress did not
intend to make § 1983 available to remedy violations of the IDEA and section 504);
Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 827 F. Supp. 2d 409, 424---25 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (on remand) (holding that compensatory damages are not available under the
IDEA).
18. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 300
(2006) (holding that expert fees are not recoverable costs for prevailing parents under
the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision); see also Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (holding that under the IDEA, the burden of proof in an
administrative hearing challenging an IEP is not automatically on the school district,
but on the party seeking relief); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited
Role in Special Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE
JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 121, 125 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R.
West eds., 2009) (opining that the Schaffer and Arlington decisions ‘‘are part of a
‘pro-school’ trend’’); Terry Jean Seligmann & Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory
Education for IDEA Violations: The Silly Putty of Remedies?, 45 URB. LAW. 281,
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education rights of those living in poverty. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the Third Circuit’s changed approach to the remedial
framework afforded to impoverished parents and their children with
disabilities who wrongfully have been denied essential special
education programming and services for lengthy periods of time. This
Article proposes that courts’ misreading and misapplication of the
IDEA’s 2004 statute of limitations and overly restrictive
interpretation of its exceptions have whittled away the already limited
remedies available for children with disabilities without financial
means, depriving them of adequate recourse. These are many of the
same children who have the greatest need for proper special
education services, based on demographics and research evidencing
links between poverty, child development, disability, and educational
outcomes.19 Approximately two-thirds of children with disabilities
found eligible for special education across the country live in
households earning less than $50,000, and nearly one-half of those
families have incomes falling at or below the federal poverty line.20
This Article begins with a summary of research findings regarding
the intersection of poverty, disability, and educational outcomes.
Data specific to Newark, New Jersey, where this author works, is
cited, at times, to provide context. Part II provides a brief overview
of the remedies accessible under the IDEA and focuses in particular
on the availability of the remedial scheme to families with limited
financial resources in the Third Circuit. Part III explores the
language of the IDEA’s 2004 statute of limitations provision and
exceptions, and analyzes the Third Circuit’s interpretation and
application of these provisions in recent compensatory education21
cases. Part IV presents two case studies illustrating the chilling effects
of these decisions on the ability of parents without means and their

295 (2013) (noting ‘‘what has been largely a constricting trend in interpretation of the
IDEA,’’ with limited exceptions).
19. See generally infra Part I.
20. See WAGNER ET AL., supra, note 11, at 29.
21. ‘‘Compensatory education’’ is defined as a remedy that may be awarded to a
child with a disability who wrongfully has been denied appropriate special education
and related services. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d
Cir. 1990). It is designed to redress prior denials of a FAPE by helping IDEAeligible children with disabilities recoup educational progress lost due to a school
district’s delay in offering or failure to provide proper educational programming and
services. See id. The award may take the form of additional programs and services
beyond the eligible child’s entitlement to an appropriate education. See id.; see also
infra Part III.
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children to obtain necessary compensatory special education22 and
related services.23 Part V concludes with a proposal for legislative
action in the form of an explicit enumeration of compensatory
education as a remedy and creation of a separate statute of limitations
for compensatory education matters consistent with legislative intent
and the Third Circuit’s prior broad remedial approach. The proposal
aims to rectify the impact of inequality based on socioeconomic status
currently in the IDEA’s remedial scheme.
I. IDENTIFYING THE AFFECTED POPULATION: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, DISABILITY,
AND E DUCATIONAL O UTCOMES
Understanding the data on the interrelationship of socioeconomic
status, disability, and educational outcomes is critical to forming an
accurate picture of the potential numbers of young people with
disabilities poorly served by the IDEA’s inferior remedial scheme.
While research abounds on the links between poverty and education,
poverty and disability, and disability and education, few studies have
examined the intersection of all three factors simultaneously. The
interrelationship may be extrapolated, however, by examining the bifactor associations in tandem. Each of these associations is discussed
in turn below. Together, they paint a bleak portrait of the lives and
futures of many children.
Poverty in the United States has increased in recent years------a likely
consequence of the 2007 economic downturn.24 In 2010, 22% of
children between the ages of 0---17 lived in poverty (defined as having
an annual income of $22,113 for a family of four).25 The rate grew by
5% since 2006, when 17% lived in poverty.26 Significantly, nearly

22. ‘‘Special education’’ is defined as ‘‘specially designed instruction . . . to meet
the unique needs of a child with a disability’’ and provided at no cost to parents. 20
U.S.C. § 1401(29) (2012).
23. ‘‘Related services’’ are ‘‘developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services[,] including speech-language pathology[,] . . . physical and occupational
therapy, . . . [and] social work services . . . as may be required to assist a child with a
disability from special education.’’ § 1401(26)(A).
24. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 12 (2011),
available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Initiatives/kids%20count/123/2011kids
countdataBook/2011kcdb_final.pdf [hereinafter 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK].
25. See FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA’S CHILDREN IN
BRIEF: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 6 (2012), available at
http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2012/ac_12.pdf.
26. See id. The child poverty rate continued to grow thereafter to twenty-three
percent in 2011. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 7
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one-half of these children lived in extreme poverty in households with
incomes at or below 50% of the federal poverty level, defined in 2010
as a yearly household income of $11,057 for a family of four.27
Great inequalities exist in the distribution of child poverty based
on race and ethnicity. Of the children living in poverty in 2010, 39%
were African-American non-Hispanic, 35% were Hispanic, and 12%
were white.28 These racial and ethnic differences are not surprising in
light of 2009 data showing that the median wealth of white
households was twenty times greater than that of African-American
households and eighteen times greater than that of Latino
households.29 Children in poverty are more likely to live in singleparent households as well.30
The numbers are even more sobering in areas with high
concentrations of poverty. For example, 18% of all New Jersey
children lived at or below the federal poverty level in 2011, defined as
an annual household income of $22,350 for a family of four.31 That
same year, approximately 50% of children under the age of five
(more than 13,000 children) in the city of Newark lived in households
with incomes at or below the federal poverty level.32 More than 6500
children in Newark lived in extreme poverty, with household incomes
less than or equal to 50% of the federal poverty level.33
The location of a family’s residence further influences a parent’s
ability to provide for basic needs due to cost of living differentials
across the country. To illustrate, a 2008 study by the Legal Services of
New Jersey Poverty Research Institute found that for many New
Jersey residents, including those residing in Newark, the ‘‘real cost of
living’’ was nearly three times the federal poverty line and the
(2013), available at http://datacenter.kidscount.org/files/2013KIDSCOUNTData
Book.pdf [hereinafter 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK].
27. See FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 6.
28. See id. (clarifying that these percentages refer to respondents who indicated
only one racial identity, thus those who identified with more than one racial identity
are not accounted for in the percentages).
29. See Rakesh Kochhar et al., Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, PEW RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (July 26, 2011),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highsbetween-whites-blacks-hispanics.
30. See Jonathan Bradshaw, Poor Children, 17 CHILD. & SOC’Y 162, 170 (2003)
(finding 44% of poor children live in single-parent households and 55% of children in
single-parent households are poor).
31. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., NEWARK KIDS COUNT 2012---2013, at
11 (2013), available at http://www.acnj.org/admin.asp?uri=2081&action=15&di=2386
&ext=pdf&view=yes.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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minimum wage.34 According to the 2013 Economic Policy Institute’s
Family Budget Calculator, which was created to estimate the cost of
‘‘getting by,’’ a family of four (two parents with two children) residing
in Newark requires an annual income of $80,568 to ‘‘secure a basic,
yet modest, standard of living.’’35 This requirement is a far cry from
the 2013 federal poverty level of $23,550 for a family of four.36
Sadly, these numbers likely do not offer a full view of the
widespread economic and material hardship in the United States.
The U.S. Census Bureau has been accused of ‘‘undercounting’’ people
who live in poverty, due in part to an outdated federal definition of
the term.37 In reality, those living between 100---200% of the federal
poverty level also experience economic and material hardship and
cannot meet basic family needs for food, shelter, healthcare, and

34. See DIANA M. PEARCE, THE REAL COST OF LIVING IN 2008: THE SELFSUFFICIENCY STANDARD FOR NEW JERSEY 7---12 (2008), available at
http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/docs/New%20Jersey%202008.pdf (using realworld assumptions to measure the real cost of living, and defining the real cost of
living as the income needed for a family with a certain composition living in a certain
location to adequately meet their basic needs without public or private assistance).
35. See Family Budget Calculator, ECON. POL’Y INST., http://www.epi.org/
resources/budget (last visited Dec. 18, 2013); see also Beyond the Poverty Line: The
High Cost of ‘Getting By’ in New Jersey, N.J. STAR LEDGER (July 21, 2013),
http://blog.nj.com/perspective/2013/07/the_high_cost_of_getting_by_in.html
(citing
the Economic Policy Institute’s $80,000 estimate of the cost of ‘‘getting by’’ for a
family of four in New Jersey, and defining ‘‘getting by’’ as having enough income to
secure a basic, modest, standard of living in the community, including the costs of
basic needs such as housing, child care, food, transportation, and taxes, without
saving any money).
36. 2013 Federal Poverty Guidelines, FAMILIES USA, http://www.familiesusa.org/
resources/tools-for-advocates/guides/federal-poverty-guidelines.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2013).
37. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 11 (‘‘Low income
families are defined as those with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty
level.’’); see also ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, 2009 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK 13
(2009),
available
at
http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Other/123/2009KIDSCOUNTData
Book/AEC186_2009_KCDB_FINAL%2072.pdf (explaining that when the poverty
measure was introduced in the 1960s, it was defined as three times the annual cost of
food, which was considered to represent 33% of a household budget). Today, food
expenses account for only 10---20% of a household budget and the formula for setting
the poverty rate does not include expenses for other family needs such as child care,
transportation, and health insurance. Id.; see Bernard P. Dreyer, To Create a Better
World for Children and Families: The Case for Ending Childhood Poverty, 13
ACADEMIC PEDIATRICS 83, 83---84 (2013), available at docs.cmhnetwork.org/
download.php?id=539 (identifying failure to account for changes in expense rates and
the effects of regional variations on the cost of living as two major weaknesses in U.S.
measures of poverty).
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childcare, among other expenses.38 Researchers and economic
analysts have labeled families with incomes at or below 200% of the
federal poverty level as ‘‘low-income’’ as opposed to poor.39 When
low-income families are included in the equation, a shocking 76% of
children under the age of five lived in low-income Newark households
in 2011.40 Across the country that same year, over 32 million children
lived in low-income households (at or below 200% of the federal
poverty level, defined as $45,622 for a family of four), comprising
45% of all U.S. children.41
A. The Links Between Socioeconomic Status, Child
Development, and Educational Outcomes
Poverty is not only an issue of economics. Extensive research has
found that children raised in low-income families are less likely to
achieve success; in fact, the greater their exposure to economic
hardship, the greater their risk of failure.42 Studies have identified
links between poverty and adverse outcomes for children in
numerous areas, including: physical health; mental, emotional, and
behavioral health; cognitive development; language development; and
educational attainment and academic achievement.43
38. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 11; see also HEATHER
BOUSHEY ET AL., HARDSHIPS IN AMERICA: THE REAL STORY OF WORKING FAMILIES
2 (2001), available at http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/books/hardships_intro.pdf.
Of families with incomes falling under 200% of the federal poverty line, nearly 30%
faced at least one critical hardship, e.g., food insecurity, eviction, lack of access to
essential medical care. Id. More than 72% had at least one serious hardship, e.g.,
food concerns, insufficient child care, use of emergency room for medical care, and
these families experienced almost the same incidence of critical and serious hardships
as families living at or below the poverty line. Id.
39. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 24, at 7.
40. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 31, at 7, 11.
41. See 2013 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 26, at 21.
42. See 2011 KIDS COUNT DATA BOOK supra note 24, at 10; see also Nat’l Inst. of
Child Health & Human Dev. Early Child Care Research Network, Duration and

Developmental Timing of Poverty and Children’s Cognitive and Social Development
from Birth Through Third Grade, 76 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 795, 795 (2005) (citing
studies demonstrating that children raised in ‘‘persistent or chronic poverty’’ fare
worse in cognitive and social development and have poorer physical and mental
health than those who experience only ‘‘transitory poverty’’).
43. See Hirokazu Yoshikawa et al., The Effects of Poverty on the Mental,
Emotional, and Behavioral Health of Children and Youth, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
272, 273 (2012) (reviewing literature on the effects of family poverty on mental,
emotional, and behavioral health); see also Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn,
Family Poverty, Welfare Reform, and Child Development, 71 CHILD DEV. 188, 188
(2000) (summarizing literature on the likely effects of poverty on child development
and life chances, and referencing ‘‘countless studies, books and reports’’ showing a
correlation between children’s poverty and measures of child achievement, behavior
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In the area of child development, studies have revealed the adverse
effects of poverty on children’s cognitive and language skills.44 For
example, researchers have identified disparities in the vocabulary
range of children born to parents with advanced levels of education
and income and those born to parents with less education and income
at as early as eighteen months of age.45 One study of language
development revealed that Newark-born preschoolers’ language
proficiency falls far below national norms, with 62% of Newark threeyear-olds scoring below the fifteenth percentile on a standardized test
of English vocabulary, compared to national norms of 15% of threeyear-olds scoring below the fifteenth percentile.46 Still another study
found that by age four, children living in poverty are on average

and health). However, the question remains whether the relationship is a causal one.
Several models have been proposed to pinpoint specific causal factors for the
association between socioeconomic status and development, health and well-being,
such as the direct effects model (poverty influences development and education ‘‘by
increasing risk factors [associated with poverty] and limiting protective factors’’); the
family stress model (positing that economic hardship leads to family stress which
compromises parenting skills, thereby affecting development); and the community
influences model (considering the characteristics and effects of low-income
neighborhoods, including high density, crime, underfunded schools, and limited
socialization opportunities). See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 245---46. Still other
models criticize the aforementioned paradigms for oversimplifying the impact of
poverty. See, e.g., J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Effects of Poverty on Child Health
and Development, 18 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 463, 464 (1997) (noting the difficulty
of untangling ‘‘the effect of poverty per se and the disadvantageous family structures
common in poor families’’); see also O’Connor & Fernandez, supra note 10, at 6---11
(arguing that current models conceptualizing the impact of poverty oversimplify the
problem by failing to acknowledge the effects of culture and bias favoring white,
middle class norms and thereby reinforcing disproportionality in the special
education arena). Regardless of the causal factors, the adverse consequences are
clear.
44. See Kimberly G. Noble et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Socioeconomic
Status in Kindergarten Children, 8 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 74, 83 (2005) (describing
the association between socioeconomic status, cognitive ability and achievement as
strong, and noting the sizeable effects of socioeconomic status on the language and
executive functioning systems); see also Brian J. Bigelow, There’s an Elephant in the

Room: The Impact of Early Poverty and Neglect on Intelligence and Common
Learning Disorders in Children, Adolescents, and their Parents, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES BULLETIN 177, 202 (2006) (opining that most learning disorders are
aggravated by or ‘‘actually caused in the presence of’’ persistent poverty, particularly
in the early years); Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty
on Children, CHILD. AND POVERTY, Summer/Fall 1997, at 61 (finding that children
living below the federal poverty level are 1.3 times more likely than their nonimpoverished peers to have learning disabilities and developmental delays).
45. See ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN OF N.J., supra note 31, at 7.
46. See BENDHEIM-THOMAN CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON CHILD WELLBEING,
EARLY LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT (2006), available at http://www.fragilefamilies.
princeton.edu/newark/Language%20development%20brief%20-%20UE.pdf.

610

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. 41

eighteen months behind their middle-class peers in cognitive skills
(e.g., long term memory, attention abilities).47 Researchers have
determined that children raised in chronically impoverished families
exhibit more behavior problems as well.48
For school-age children, the detrimental effects of economic
hardship persist. Numerous studies document the link between
decreased school readiness49 and economic hardship, revealing that
poor and low-income children commence school at a ‘‘cognitive and
behavioral disadvantage.’’50 This gap typically widens over time, and
thus differences in school readiness can have lifelong consequences:
‘‘School readiness has been shown to be predictive of virtually every
educational benchmark (e.g., achievement test scores, grade
retention, special education placement, dropout, etc.).’’51 Researchers
have examined the converse as well, finding that higher
socioeconomic status correlates with better academic outcomes for
children, particularly in the areas of cognition and school measures,
but also in behavioral and health measures.52 It is significant to note
that the achievement gap between children from low- and highincome households increased by as much as 40% for children born in
2001 compared to children born twenty-five years prior, while the
racial gap narrowed.53

47. See THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, ANNUAL REPORT: INSPIRE/ASPIRE 2
(2012), http://www.childrensaidsociety.org/files/upload-docs/CAS_AR_web_0.pdf.
48. See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 244 (citing evidence from the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development Early Child Care Research
Network).
49. See H.B. Ferguson et al., The Impact of Poverty on Educational Outcomes for
Children, 12 PEDIATRIC CHILD. HEALTH 701, 701 (2007) (defining school readiness as
requiring ‘‘physical well-being and appropriate motor development, emotional health
and a positive approach to new experiences, age-appropriate social knowledge and
competence, age-appropriate language skills, and age-appropriate general knowledge
and cognitive skills’’).
50. Id. at 701---02.
51. See Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 244 (quoting E. ZIGLER, ET AL., A
VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION 21 (2006)).
52. See Ferguson et al., supra note 49, at 702. For example, a 2011 study found
that over 80% of African-American, Latino, and Native American fourth graders
were not proficient in reading, compared to 58% of white students. See 2013 KIDS
COUNT DATA BOOK, supra note 26, at 26. When examining the effects of income,
82% of low-income students were not reading proficient, versus 52% of higher
income peers. See id. The percentage breakdowns based on race and economics
were nearly identical when examining eighth graders’ math proficiency as well. See
id. at 26, 27.
53. See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between
the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, EDUC.
LEADERSHIP, May 2013, at 10.
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Children living in low-income households also are at greater risk of
leaving school prior to graduation.54 In some economically deprived
communities, nearly 30% of youth do not graduate from high
school,55 almost 75% of low-income students and students of color
who enroll in higher education after high school do not earn a
degree,56 and only 8% of children born into poverty graduate from
college by age twenty-five.57 Significantly, 40% of African-American
and Latino students attend schools where 70---100% of students are
poor, in contrast to one out of every thirty white students.58
High school dropouts are at much higher risk of unemployment,
substance use and abuse, and incarceration than their peers who
graduate.59 Notably, young people of higher socioeconomic status are
more likely to get back on track after dropping out of school when
compared to their peers living in low-income households.60 The
combined effects of poverty and education create an unending cycle:
‘‘Poverty limits the chances of educational attainment, and at the

54. See Dan Bloom, Programs and Policies to Assist High School Dropouts in the
Transition to Adulthood, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 2010, at 92.
55. See THE CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY, supra note 47, at 6 (stating that in the
United States, one low-income student drops out of high school every 26 seconds
and, in the communities served by Children’s Aid Society, almost 1/3 of adolescents
do not graduate from high school).
56. See id. at 8.
57. See id. at 1.
58. See GARY ORFIELD, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGE 15 (2009), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integratedsociety-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf; see also
ROBERT BALFANZ & NETTIE LEGTERS, LOCATING THE DROPOUT CRISIS, at v (2004),
available at http://www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report70.pdf (finding
nearly 50% of African American students, nearly 40% Latino students, and only
11% white students attend high schools where graduation is not the norm).
59. See DAN BLOOM & RON HASKINS, HELPING HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS
IMPROVE THEIR PROSPECTS 1 (2010), available at http://futureofchildren.org/
futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_01_PolicyBrief.pdf; see also Carolyn Hughes &
Selete K. Avoke, The Elephant in the Room: Poverty, Disability, and Employment,
RES. & PRACTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES, Spring/Summer 2010, at
6. For example, a 2007 study found that more than 50% of high school dropouts
between the ages of 16 and 19 had no paid employment. See Bloom, supra note 54, at
91; see also Carolyn Hughes, Poverty and Disability: Addressing the Challenge of
Inequality, CAREER DEV. & TRANSITION FOR EXCEPTIONAL INDIVIDUALS, May 2013,
at 40 (discussing the ‘‘near 50% unemployment rate of Black urban male high school
dropouts’’). Another study revealed that more than two-thirds of state prison
inmates did not have a high school diploma. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 91; see also
CAROLYN WOLF HARLOW, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003),
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/bjs/ecp.pdf (reporting that 68% of
prison inmates did not obtain a high school diploma).
60. See Bloom, supra note 54, at 92.
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same time, educational attainment is one of the prime mechanisms for
escaping poverty.’’61
B.

The Link Between Socioeconomic Status and Disability

Similar to the interplay between poverty and education, disability
has been described as ‘‘both a cause and an effect of poverty.’’62
There is a higher prevalence of poverty among persons with
disabilities,63 and children living in poverty are at high risk for
disability.64 In 2010, approximately 19%, or 56.7 million, of the nearly
304 million United States non-institutionalized civilian population
That same year,
reported having one or more disabilities.65
approximately 28.6% of persons with disabilities, ages 15---64, lived in
poverty, as opposed to 14.5% of non-disabled persons.66
With respect to children, 8.4% of non-institutionalized young
people under age fifteen, or 5.2 million, had a disability in 2010, with
approximately half having a severe disability.67 More than 25% of
children with disabilities live in households with incomes at or below
the federal poverty line.68 As is the case for children living in poverty,

61. Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 243.
62. Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 5; see also Susan L. Parish et al., Material
Hardship in U.S. Families Raising Children with Disabilities, 75 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD. 75, 73 (2008) (‘‘Poverty------through exposure to environmental hazards------leads
to disability, and disability------by way of increased financial burdens------leads to
poverty.’’).
63. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 38.
64. See Carla A. Peterson et al., Meeting Needs of Young Children at Risk for or
Having a Disability, EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUC. J., March 2010, at 509, 512
[hereinafter Meeting Needs]; see also Carla A. Peterson et al., Early Head Start:
Identifying and Serving Children with Disabilities, TOPICS IN EARLY CHILDHOOD
SPECIAL EDUC., June 2004, at 76 (discussing the high risk of poor developmental
outcomes for children living in poverty, and associations between poverty and poorer
development in cognition, poorer health, higher rates of learning disabilities, and
developmental delays).
65. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES: 2010 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 5 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf.
66. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 13.
68. See Parish et al., supra note 62, at 71 (adding that children with disabilities are
‘‘significantly more likely to live in families that are considered to be poor’’); see also
Marcia K. Meyers et al., The Cost of Caring: Childhood Disability and Poor Families,
84 SOC. SERV. REV. 209, 219 (studying the cost of caring for children with disabilities
in families living in poverty and finding that childhood disability is ‘‘considerably
more prevalent among current and recent welfare recipients than in the general
population’’).
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children with disabilities are more likely to live in households headed
by single parents.69
Poverty-associated risk factors affecting health and development-----such as food insecurity, harmful housing conditions, insufficient
stimulation, and poor access to educational and other resources------can
place low-income children at greater risk for developing disabilities
and exacerbate pre-existing disabilities.70
Moreover, childhood
disability can cause or worsen financial and material hardship, as
families often must bear additional disability-related costs, including
specialized treatments, services, daycare, transportation, equipment,
and technologies.71 It also may hinder employment opportunities for
parents and caregivers due to the need to stay home and care for their
children.72 Yet, these same children are less likely to receive
disability-related services and more likely to confront barriers to
accessing them.73 One study found that families of children with
disabilities were ‘‘79% more likely to report that they worried that
food would run out; 94% more likely to report having cut or skipped
meals due to money; 73% more likely to have been unable to pay
their rent in the past year; and 78% more likely to have had phone
service disconnected in the past year.’’74
Just as with young people living in low-income households, young
people with disabilities have low graduation rates and are less likely
to pursue post-secondary education,75 limiting opportunities for future

69. See Glenn T. Fujiura & Kiyoshi Yamaki, Trends in Demography of
Childhood Poverty and Disability, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 187, 191 (2000) (finding a
strong association between disability risk and single-parent household status, but
adding that the greater disability rate among children of color seems to be associated
with the disproportionate representation of poor and single-parent households in the
minority community, for no additional risk was correlated with racial or ethnic
minority status when poverty and family status were statistically controlled).
70. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 8.
71. See Eric Emerson, Poverty and People with Intellectual Disabilities, 13
MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REV. 107, 109 (2007);
see also Meyers et al., supra note 68, at 229---30 (finding the direct and indirect costs
of caring for a child with a disability have significant adverse effects on the family’s
economic well-being); Parish et al., supra note 62, at 72.
72. See Emerson, supra note 71, at 109.
73. See Peterson et al., supra note 64, at 509.
74. See Emerson, supra note 71, at 108 (citing Susan L. Parrish et al., Economic

Implications of Caregiving at Midlife: Comparing Parents with and Without Children
with Disabilities, 42 MENTAL RETARDATION 413 (2004)).
75. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 7. For instance, a New York City
study included young people with disabilities among the five cohorts of youth at high
risk of leaving school without a diploma. See LAURA WYCKOFF ET AL.,
DISCONNECTED YOUNG PEOPLE IN NEW YORK CITY: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY 6---7
(2008), available at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download1/disconnected_young_
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success. In 2010, only 34% of working-age people with disabilities
had a high school diploma, and only 12% had earned a bachelor’s
degree or higher.76 As a result, adults with disabilities are more likely
to experience poverty as well.77
According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, 69.7% of persons
without disabilities were employed in June 2013, compared with
20.2% of persons with disabilities.78 Adults with disabilities who work
tend to be underemployed or receive wages that are below the federal
poverty level.79 Likewise, nearly 50% of adults who experience
poverty for at least one year have a disability, as do more than 66% of
adults who experience persistent poverty.80
Even when studies control for income, people with disabilities
remain ‘‘much more likely to experience various forms of material
hardship------including food insecurity, not getting needed medical or
dental care, and not being able to pay rent, mortgage, and utility
bills------than people without disabilities.’’81 This finding extends across

people_in_new_york_city_crisis_and_opportunity (listing the other four cohorts as
young immigrants, youth involved with the juvenile justice system, youth involved
with the foster care system, and young mothers).
76. See WILLIAM ERICKSON ET AL., 2010 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT, UNITED
STATES 6 (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1561&context=gladnetcollect; see also WYCKOFF ET AL., supra note 75, at 6
(reporting that 12,000---15,000 New York City students with disabilities, ages 14---21,
leave school without a diploma). Another study found that only 31% of young
people with intellectual disabilities were employed post high school and only 7%
attended postsecondary school as a sole post-school activity. See Hughes, supra note
59, at 39. For more information on the postsecondary experiences of young people
with disabilities, see generally LYNN NEWMAN ET AL., THE POST-HIGH SCHOOL
OUTCOMES OF YOUNG ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES UP TO EIGHT YEARS AFTER HIGH
SCHOOL: A REPORT FROM THE NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL TRANSITION STUDY-2
(NLTS2)
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nlts2.org/reports/2011_09_02/nlts2_report_2011_09_02_
complete.pdf.
77. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 39 (noting that adults with disabilities have a
greater likelihood of experiencing poverty’s adverse effects, including food insecurity,
poor housing and medical care, and difficulty paying bills).
78. Economic News Release: June 2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_07052013.htm (scroll down to
‘‘Table A-6’’).
79. See Hughes & Avoke, supra note 59, at 9.
80. See SHAWN FREMSTAD, HALF IN TEN: WHY TAKING DISABILITY INTO
ACCOUNT IS ESSENTIAL TO REDUCING INCOME POVERTY AND EXPANDING
ECONOMIC INCLUSION 11 (2009), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/poverty-disability-2009-09.pdf (defining persistent poverty as having a
household income at or below the federal poverty level for at least thirty-six months
out of a forty-eight-month period).
81. See id. at 2.

2013]

A POOR IDEA

615

all racial and ethnic groups.82 Thus, the combination of poverty and
disability can create a situation of double jeopardy for those affected,
doubling the challenges they face.
C.

The Link between Disability and Educational Outcomes

Students with disabilities receiving special education services
continue to ‘‘lag behind their nondisabled peers in educational
achievements, are often held to lower expectations, are less likely to
take the full academic curriculum in high school, and are more likely
to drop out of school.’’83 No studies have examined the overall
effectiveness of the special education system to determine if, in fact, it
works. Empirical and anecdotal evidence, however, support the
conclusion that several aspects of the system do not work, leaving
many children with disabilities unidentified or misclassified, receiving
inappropriate programming and services, or not receiving
programming and services at all.84
For example, when comparing students with and without
disabilities in the area of achievement, grade-level assessments for
reading and math showed large gaps in performance. One study
found that on high school twelfth grade assessments, 64% of students
with disabilities tested as not proficient in reading and 76% tested as
not proficient in math, in contrast to rates of 24% and 34%
respectively for students without disabilities.85 Studies also have
found that students with disabilities who spend more time in general
education classrooms tend to have better attendance, perform closer
to grade-level, and perform better on achievement tests than those
educated in pull-out settings.86 Yet, African-American students with
disabilities are half as likely to be placed in general education settings
than their white peers,87 and are more likely to be educated in

82. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 39.
83. Laudan Aron & Pamela Loprest, Disability and the Education System,
FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 2012, at 97.
84. See, e.g., id. at 103 (positing that variation across states in disability
identification rates suggests that there are many factors other than prevalence of
disability at play, and suggesting that the ‘‘often perverse, financial incentive
structures’’ in the special education system influence if and how students with
disabilities are identified and served).
85. See id. at 113.
86. See Alfredo Artiles et al., Justifying and Explaining Disproportionality, 1968--2008: A Critique of Underlying Views of Culture, 76 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 279, 285
(2010).
87. See id.
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segregated settings even when they have the same classification as
their white peers.88
As mentioned above, students with disabilities are more likely to
leave school prior to graduation.89 While on average 11% of high
school students drop out of school, approximately 50---60% of
students classified as having emotional or behavioral disabilities leave
high school without a diploma, as do more than 30% of students with
learning disabilities.90 Studies report even higher dropout rates for
youth with disabilities in detention or correctional facilities.91 When
students with disabilities do graduate, they are less likely to receive a
traditional high school diploma92 or to attend or complete postsecondary schooling,93 increasing their likelihood of facing economic
and material hardship in the future.

88. See N.J. COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 10, at 19.
Racial and ethnic disparities exist in other areas as well. See id. at 18 (reporting that
African-American students are three times as likely to be classified as having mental
retardation compared to white students and twice as likely to be classified as having
multiple disabilities and emotional disturbance, but less likely than white students to
be classified as having a speech or language impairment).
89. See Martha Thurlow et al., Students with Disabilities Who Drop out of
School------Implications for Policy and Practice, NAT’L CTR. SECONDARY EDUC. &
TRANSITION (2002), available at http://www.ncset.org/publications/printresource.
asp?id=425 (reporting that the dropout rate for students with disabilities is
approximately double that of students without disabilities).
90. See Artiles et al., supra note 86, at 285; see also Suzanne E. Kemp, Dropout
Policies and Trends for Students with and Without Disabilities, 41 ADOLESCENCE
235, 236 (2006) (noting that 50---59% of students with emotional/behavioral disorders
and 32---26% of students with learning disabilities drop out of school).
91. See id. (estimating that 30---70% of youth with disabilities in detention and
correctional institutions drop out of school).
92. See Aron & Loprest, supra note 83, at 113 (reporting that in 2005, 46% of
students with disabilities graduated with a regular diploma versus 75% of nondisabled students); see also Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without
Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 136 (2011) (reporting that only 39% of
students with disabilities ages 16---21 receive a regular high school diploma, with the
percentage dropping based on certain classifications------e.g., only 24% of students with
emotional disturbance earn a high school diploma).
93. NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 16---20 (2011) (explaining that enrollment of
young adults with disabilities in post-secondary schooling varies widely based upon
type of disability and type of post-secondary schooling). For example, in a 2009
survey, approximately 66% of young adults with a learning disability or
speech/language impairment reported enrolling in post-secondary schooling, whereas
only approximately 30% of students with mental retardation or multiple disabilities
so enrolled. In contrast, approximately 67% of young adults without disabilities
reported enrolling in post-secondary schooling. See id. Notably, young adults with
disabilities were twice as likely to have enrolled in or attended a two-year college or
vocational school as opposed to a four-year college, and almost one-third had
enrolled in more than one type of postsecondary schooling. See id. at 21.
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D. The Intersection of Socioeconomic Status, Disability, and
Educational Outcomes
Just as the effects of poverty are cumulative, so too are the effects
of learning94------‘‘consequences at one stage in a child’s development
can hinder development at a later stage.’’95 Thus, the longer a child
with a disability fails to receive proper remediation, the more likely
the disability may become ingrained and less responsive, or even
unresponsive, to treatment.96 As described above, each of the
associations between poverty and education, poverty and disability,
and disability and education, alone, can have devastating outcomes.
Operating simultaneously, these links may magnify the risk of dire
consequences even further.97 When one considers the potential
lifelong effects of a school district’s failure to provide proper special
education and related services to a child with a disability living in
poverty, the need for an appropriate remedy becomes eminently
clear.

Additionally, young adults with disabilities from households with an annual income
over $50,000 were more likely than those from households with an annual income of
$25,000 or less ever to have been enrolled in postsecondary education (70% higher
income, versus 50%). See id. at 21. But see Aron & Loprest, supra note 83, at 114
(noting that studies have found adults with disabilities have ‘‘significantly’’ lower
rates of postsecondary school completion than adults without disabilities).
94. Deborah Lowe Vandell et al., Do Effects of Early Child Care Extend to Age

15 Years? Results from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth
Development, 81 CHILD DEV. 737, 751 (2010) (noting that a link between higher
achievement during the early and adolescent years is no surprise due to the
cumulative nature of school achievement); see also DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: HOW THIRD-GRADE READING SKILLS AND POVERTY INFLUENCE HIGH
SCHOOL GRADUATION 3---4, 9 (2011), available at http://www.aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/
Topics/Education/Other/DoubleJeopardyHowThirdGradeReadingSkillsandPovery/
DoubleJeopardyReport040511FINAL.pdf (citing results of a longitudinal study of
approximately 4000 students finding that those who are not proficient readers by
third grade are four times more likely to leave school without a diploma than
proficient readers, and finding that those who do not master basic skills by third
grade are six times more likely to leave school without a high school diploma. The
rate was even higher for African-American and Hispanic students living in poverty).
95. Yoshikawa et al., supra note 43, at 274.
96. See id.; see also Early Intervention for Children with Disabilities Works,
Report Finds: Letter No. 142, [Oct.] Accommodating Disabilities Decisions (CCH)
No. 143 (Oct. 3, 2003), 2003 WL 26457054 (discussing the analogous findings of the
National Early Intervention Longitudinal Study, which, according to then Assistant
Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Robert Pasternack,
provided further evidence that ‘‘the earlier we identify children with disabilities and
provide [sound] interventions, the better chance they have of reaching their full
potential’’).
97. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 94, at 3 (describing the combined effects of
reading poorly and living in poverty as placing children in ‘‘double jeopardy’’).
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Despite the challenges, all hope is not lost for these children.
Numerous studies over the last two decades have found that early,
intensive, prolonged intervention can affect language, cognition, and
social development dramatically,98 which can narrow the
socioeconomic performance gap in these key areas and provide
benefits that last into adulthood.99 Additionally, researchers have
opined that, ‘‘children living in poverty benefit more than others from
early educational settings that are high quality, with children with
special educational needs demonstrating longer-term benefits.’’100
Instances exist where early intervention has succeeded in preventing a
future need for intervention.101
The timing, duration, and
appropriateness of intervention, however, are critical components of
success,102 with both early and ongoing interventions necessary for
remediation: ‘‘[i]t is unrealistic to think of earlier intervention as an
alternative to later intervention when problems have become
established: both are needed.’’103

98. See P.A. Howard-Jones et al., The Timing of Educational Investment: A
Neuroscientific Perspective, 2S DEVELOPMENTAL COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE S18,
S19 (2012); see also Engle & Black, supra note 12, at 248 (reporting that research
reveals that high-quality preschool services combined with parent involvement and
improvement in health status can significantly affect a child’s language and cognitive
skills by the age of five).
99. See Howard-Jones et al., supra note 98, at 19; see also Noble et al., supra note
44, at 84 (reviewing studies finding long-term benefits of early childhood programs
including ‘‘persistent, cost-effective effects on academic achievement’’).
100. Howard-Jones et al., supra note 98, at 23.
101. See id. (reporting examples in which early intervention succeeded in
preventing a need for later intervention).
102. See, e.g., Sally E. Shaywitz et al., The Education of Dyslexic Children from
Childhood to Young Adulthood, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451, 463, 467 (2008)
(finding that for children with dyslexia who receive interventions after second grade,
‘‘it is more challenging to bring [them] up to expected grade levels once they fall
behind,’’ and that while ‘‘significant improvements in reading can still occur,’’
evidence reveals less-consistent positive results than for those who receive
intervention during the younger years); see also Allyson P. Mackey et al.,
Environmental Influences on Prefrontal Development, in PRINCIPLES OF FRONTAL
LOBE FUNCTION 146 (Donald T. Struss & Robert T. Knight eds., 2012), available at
https://courses.cit.cornell.edu/rdr98/papers/Mackey_Bunge_Raizada_Stuss_and_Knig
ht_2nd_Ed_2012.pdf (reporting that a high degree of plasticity for language appears
to taper off at age eight or earlier); Margje van der Schuit et al., Early Language

Intervention for Children with Intellectual Disabilities: A Neurocognitive
Perspective, 32 RES. DEV. DISABILITIES 705, 705, 711 (2011) (finding that early
intervention produced substantial developmental gains in children with intellectual
disabilities where the intervention was prolonged and occurred across different
settings, but that when intervention and assessment stopped, additional growth
slowed greatly).
103. JUNE STATHAM & MARJORIE SMITH, ISSUES IN EARLIER INTERVENTION:
IDENTIFYING AND SUPPORTING CHILDREN WITH ADDITIONAL NEEDS 12 (2010),
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Notwithstanding the aggregate adverse effects of the intersection of
poverty, education, and disability on child outcomes, and the proven
success of early appropriate interventions, low-income parents of
children with disabilities face major obstacles in obtaining proper
educational programming and services for their children. These
obstacles often relate to power imbalances that arise from differences
between school district personnel and parents in education level,
knowledge base, language, and access to expertise, including legal
counsel.104 The power imbalances create an unequal playing field that
favors school districts and impedes parental participation in their
children’s education, particularly for poor or low-income parents.105
The imbalances also restrict parents’ ability to advocate successfully
in the special education arena, thereby hindering access to
appropriate special education programming and services.106
To illustrate, a 2003 study of the United States population’s literacy
skills found that 86% of persons aged 25---29 who are not high schooleducated or the equivalent ‘‘may be considered to have limited
literacy.’’107 Researchers also have discovered that parents of children
with disabilities have lower rates of educational attainment than the

available
at
http://www.ioe.ac.uk/about/documents/TCRU_Issues_in_Earlier_
Intervention.pdf.
104. See Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172---173 (2005) (describing the current special
education system as yielding ‘‘lower payoffs for needier families, which are on
average less endowed with bargaining power and therefore less capable of taking
advantage of participation opportunities’’ in their child’s education); see also Eloise
Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1432 (2011) (explaining how the IDEA’s private
enforcement system results in wealthier parents of children with disabilities obtaining
superior services compared to low-income parents of children with disabilities).
105. See Carmen Gomez Mandic et al., Readability of Special Education
Procedural Safeguards, 45 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 195, 200 (2012) (positing that ‘‘parents of
children with disabilities who are most vulnerable to poor educational, social, and
employment outcomes------those from disadvantaged backgrounds------may also be those
most likely to experience difficulty being involved in the children’s education,’’ and
citing to studies demonstrating the ways in which literacy features of the special
education system may actually impede parental participation in their children’s
education).
106. See Chopp, supra note 2, at 438 (‘‘[W]hen parents do not have the skills or
resources to advocate for their children, the IEP team becomes one-sided . . . school
districts make the educational decisions for the disabled child, and the parents-----without knowing the alternatives------are left with an IEP into which they had very little
input.’’).
107. Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 198 (‘‘limited literacy’’ is determined by
scoring at ‘‘below basic’’ or ‘‘basic’’ levels in prose literacy, making one likely to
experience ‘‘considerable difficulty in performing tasks that required [him/her] to
integrate or synthesize information from complex or lengthy texts’’).
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general population and, thus, are more likely to have limited literacy
skills.108 In accordance with the IDEA, school districts must provide
parents of children with disabilities with a written copy of their
procedural safeguards109 one time per year, with some exceptions.110
The procedural safeguards serve as an informational resource for
parents: ‘‘These documents represent the primary way in which
schools provide written notice to parents of their right and their
children’s rights in the special education system.’’111 They must be
written in the parents’ native language, unless it is clearly infeasible
for a school district to do so, and written in an ‘‘easily
understandable’’ manner.112 Disturbingly, despite these requirements,
studies have found that more than 50% of procedural safeguards are
written at the college reading level and 40% at the graduate or
professional level, rendering the information contained therein
difficult and sometimes impossible to understand, even for those with
higher level literacy skills.113
Further exacerbating the problem, special education evaluation
reports, testing scores, the Individualized Education Program
(IEP),114 special education state regulations, and administrative
hearing rules with which parents must comply when formally
challenging school district actions all are written in discipline-specific,

108. See id. at 198, 200.
109. Procedural safeguards provide an explanation of the special education rights
of children with disabilities and the rights of their parents. Examples include the
rights to notice, to review school records, to participate in meetings, and to file a
complaint. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400---1482 (2012); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.500--300.538 (2013).
110. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A) (providing that school districts must make a
copy of the procedural safeguards available to parents of children with disabilities
one time per year, as well as upon initial referral of a child for an evaluation, parental
request for an evaluation, filing of a complaint and parental request for a copy of the
safeguards).
111. See Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 196.
112. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2).
113. Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 200; see also Julie L. Fitzgerald & Marley W.
Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special Education: The Readability of Procedural
Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497, 506 (2006) (finding that only 4---8% of
parents’ rights documents were written at or below the recommended seventh to
eighth grade reading level, making them too difficult for average people to
comprehend).
114. The ‘‘individualized education program’’ is a written statement for each child
with a disability that sets forth the child’s strengths and educational needs and
provides, among other things, a description of the special education and related
services the child requires in order to make educational progress. See 20 U.S.C. §
1414(d).
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technical jargon.115
As such, they typically require higher level
literacy skills for comprehension.116 Adding the variable of English as
a second language to the mix impedes parental participation as well,
and further cements power imbalances in favor of school districts.117
In addition to the harmful effects of differences in education levels,
knowledge base, and language, the high cost of challenging school
district decisions regarding the provision of a free and appropriate
public education (FAPE) to children with disabilities renders
successful advocacy, or even the ability to advocate, unattainable for
many.118 Parents frequently require outside experts to help translate
and better understand the highly technical, discipline-specific
language used in a child’s evaluation reports and teacher or service
provider recommendations.119 To challenge the presumed ‘‘expertise’’
of school district professionals in formal dispute resolution processes,
parents must obtain outside testing, classroom observations, review of
school records, and expert reports and testimony.120
Hearings
typically occur over many days and may result in lost time at work,

115. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special
education matters; see also Pasachoff supra note 104, at 1439---40 (2011) (noting that
poor families tend to be less aware of their special education rights and the ‘‘meaning
of particular diagnoses’’).
116. See Mandic et al., supra note 105, at 200 (‘‘[W]hen literacy and language
demands exceed people’s skills, access to information, services, and rights is
compromised.’’).
117. See, e.g., Nydia Torres-Burgo et al., Perceptions and Needs of Hispanic and
Non-Hispanic Parents of Children Receiving Learning Disabilities Services, 23
BILINGUAL RES. J. 373, 379 (1999) (finding that school districts significantly less often
explained IDEA rights to parents in their native language of Spanish, and
significantly less often asked parents if they understood their children’s IEPs than
they did for non-Hispanic parents.).
118. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special
education matters. For background, see Michael A. Rebell, The Right to
Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 115 n.309
(2012) (theorizing that ‘‘because of the advocacy skills and resources of their
parents,’’ students from middle class and high income families enjoy special education
benefits to a greater extent than children from impoverished families). For
additional background, see Pasachoff, supra note 104, at 1417 (‘‘[E]vidence suggests
that children from wealthier families enforce their rights under the [IDEA] at higher
rates than do children in poverty . . . .’’).
119. This information is based on my personal experience as a special education
attorney representing low-income parents of children with disabilities in special
education matters.
120. Id.
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additional childcare costs, and other expenses, including the cost of
legal representation.121
Parents of children with disabilities from low-income households
confront extremely difficult odds when challenging school districts for
failing to educate their children properly. Few receive the help of an
attorney, due to continual underfunding of the legal services system.
According to Legal Services of New Jersey, approximately one in
every four state residents qualifies for free legal services; at current
funding rates, however, there is only one legal services attorney for
every 11,000 eligible clients, resulting in thousands of social and legal
problems that go unaddressed each year.122 Fewer than ten attorneys
in New Jersey routinely provide free legal representation to lowincome parents of children with disabilities in special education
matters, and even fewer accompany a parent through a due process
hearing123.124 As a result, low-income parents typically are left to
challenge school districts on their own.125
While parents of children with disabilities from low-income
households are less likely to receive legal assistance in pursuing
special education challenges against school districts, legal
representation is one of the greatest determinants of success in a
special education due process hearing.126 According to an Illinois
study, parents won approximately 50% of special education due
process hearings when represented by a lawyer; without legal
representation, they won only 16.8% of hearings.127 These numbers
121. Id.
122. See The New Jersey Legal Services System at a Glance, LEGAL SERVICES N.J.
(July 22, 2013), http://www.lsnj.org/PDFs/Glance.pdf.
123. A due process hearing is a trial-like legal proceeding in which all parties have
an opportunity to present evidence and make arguments before an impartial
administrative law judge. The judge then issues a decision which is considered final
but appealable. See generally Cali Cope-Kasten, Bidding (Fair)well to Due Process:
The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 J.L. &
EDUC. 501 (2013) (describing and evaluating the IDEA’s due process hearing
mechanism in detail).
124. This number does not include private attorneys who occasionally handle
special education matters pro bono. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES
CORPORATION
2012
FACT
BOOK
18---19
(2013),
available
at
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/lsc.gov/files/LSC/lscgov4/AnnualReports/2012_Fact%20Book
_FINALforWEB.pdf (noting that out of the approximately 809,000 cases closed
nationwide by LSC in 2012, 0.7% were education matters, and 0.2%, or just short of
2000 cases, pertained to special education matters).
125. See MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM:
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS 1997---2002, at 6
(2002), available at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf.
126. See id. at 7.
127. See id.
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are further discouraging when one considers that attorneys represent
school districts in 94% of due process hearings, and parents in only
44% of these matters.128 Due to the cost and shortage of free legal
representation in special education matters, wealthy parents access
the private enforcement scheme of the IDEA more than low-income
parents.129 Notably, ‘‘[w]hen poor children enforce their rights at
lower rates than wealthier children, the dynamics tend to lead to
better services for wealthier children.’’130 In light of these power
imbalances and cost impediments, it is no wonder that more and more
school districts seek to contain expenses by limiting or reducing
services for those with the quietest voices.
Society should invest its time, money, and resources in fully
implementing the IDEA’s mandate to provide every child with a
disability with a FAPE in the least restrictive environment, and
improving the timeliness and appropriateness of educational
interventions. Until society cures the ills at the front end of the
system, however, legislators and the courts must strengthen remedies
on the back-end for low-income children with disabilities who
wrongfully have been denied appropriate special education and
related services. More than ten years of admittedly anecdotal
experience on the part of this author reveals that, in some low-income
communities, school districts factor into the cost-benefit-risk analysis
the likelihood they will get caught or taken to task for denying
children with disabilities desperately needed programming and
services to which they are entitled.131 Because so few parents of
children with disabilities in these communities have the necessary
support, knowledge, skills, and resources to successfully challenge
school districts, some districts play the odds and routinely win; even
when school districts lose, the cost seldom is so great that it deters
them from playing the odds again and again.132 In so doing, these

128. See id. Although this study did not examine family income and the need for
free legal services, one may posit, though not conclude, that based on the shortage of
free legal counsel in special education matters, many parents who did not have legal
representation came from low-income households.
129. See Pasachoff, supra note 104, at 1417---18.
130. Id. at 1419; see also Chopp, supra note 2, at 447 (‘‘Where there are finite
resources, these resources will be allocated to those who advocate most forcefully for
them, i.e., to the children whose parents have the wherewithal and financial means to
enforce their children’s due process rights.’’).
131. Since 2001, the author has represented low-income parents of children with
disabilities in special education matters as a clinical professor in the Education and
Health Law Clinic at Rutgers University School of Law-Newark.
132. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Where Have All the Lawsuits Gone? The Shockingly
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school districts perpetuate inequality in the special education system
based on socioeconomic status. This Article proposes that a first step
in breaking the cycle is providing an adequate remedial scheme for
the children affected.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA’S R EMEDIAL SCHEME
The IDEA is the primary federal law governing the education of
children with disabilities.133 It offers federal funding to states in
exchange for states’ commitment to implement a special education
program that abides by the Act’s mandates.134 In accordance with the
law, states must provide eligible students with disabilities between the
ages of three and twenty-one with a ‘‘free and appropriate public
education’’135 in the least restrictive environment.136 To be eligible for
programming and services under the IDEA, a child must have a
statutorily recognized disability, and the disability must adversely
affect the child’s ability to learn such that the child requires special
education and related services. 137 Once a child is found eligible, the
school district must develop an Individualized Education Program
(IEP) that is designed to meet the child’s unique needs.138 The IEP
serves as the primary vehicle for the implementation of a child’s
Act 12 (Faculty Working Paper Series No. 08-12-05, 2008) (noting that, on average,
school districts spend nine dollars per classified student on litigation costs in one
year).
133. In addition to the IDEA, other anti-discrimination legislation such as section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012), ensures access to
an appropriate education for students with disabilities.
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2012) (authorizing grants to states for provision of
special education and related services to children with disabilities in accordance with
the IDEA).
135. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012); see also id. § 1412(a)(1)(A). A ‘‘free and
appropriate public education’’ is defined as ‘‘educational instruction specially
designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such
services as are necessary to permit the child ‘to benefit’ from the instruction.’’ Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188---89 (1982) (requiring states to provide only a
minimum floor of educational opportunity to students, not the best education
possible).
136. See § 1412(a)(5)(A); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the Act’s ‘‘least restrictive environment’’ mandate requires school
districts to educate children with disabilities with children without disabilities to the
maximum extent appropriate).
137. See § 1401(3) (defining an eligible student with a disability as a student who
needs special education and related services due to mental retardation, hearing
impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, specific learning
disabilities, or other health impairments); see also § 1401(26), (29).
138. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181.
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special education and related services; it is a written plan that sets
forth, among other things, the child’s present levels of performance,
the child’s educational strengths and needs, the programs and services
the child will receive, and the measurable goals the child is expected
to attain.139
The Act provides detailed procedural safeguards to protect the
rights of parents and children.140 Among the procedural safeguards,
states must implement methods for parents and guardians to
challenge the identification, evaluation, classification, programming,
and provision of a FAPE to their children in the event they disagree
with school district decisions.141 This includes providing processes for
the filing of a complaint with the state, a request for mediation, an
impartial due process hearing, and/or bringing a civil action.142
When a parent of a child with a disability brings an action against a
school district, either in the form of a due process hearing or a civil
action, the IDEA (and prior versions of the Act) grants judges broad
discretion in their remedial authority. The IDEA provides that the
court ‘‘shall grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.’’143
Through litigation over the course of more than thirty-five years, the
Third Circuit has translated this authority into the following types of
relief: equitable remedies of tuition reimbursement and/or
compensatory education, general declaratory relief,144 injunctive
relief,145 and, for a limited time, monetary damages.146 Parents may
obtain these forms of relief through the administrative hearing
process, with the exception of monetary damages and attorneys’ fees
and costs.147 Relevant to this Article are the remedies of tuition
139. See § 1401(14); see also id. § 1414(d).
140. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400---1482 (2012).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); 34 C.F.R. 300.516(c)(3) (2013).
144. Examples of declaratory relief include a court’s determination that a child is
eligible for special education and related services, or that a school district provided a
FAPE to a child with a disability.
145. For example, injunctive relief may be awarded in actions regarding the
IDEA’s ‘‘stay put’’ provision by requiring school districts to continue paying for
programming and services for a child pending resolution of the dispute.
146. The Third Circuit previously permitted awards of monetary damages, using §
1983 to enforce the IDEA. See generally supra note 17 and accompanying text. Since
damages are no longer an available remedy in the Third Circuit, I will not discuss
them here.
147. For a detailed discussion of the remedial authority of hearing officers in
special education disputes, see generally Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of

Hearing and Review Officers Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
An Update, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011).
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reimbursement and compensatory education, and both are discussed
in more detail below.
A. Tuition Reimbursement
Aside from declaratory and injunctive relief, tuition
reimbursement is the primary remedy courts may award to parents of
children with disabilities. The U.S. Supreme Court established tuition
reimbursement as a form of equitable relief in IDEA matters in 1985
with its decision in School Committee of the Town of Burlington v.
Department of Education.148 There, the Court held that when a
school district develops an inappropriate IEP for a student and the
parent unilaterally opts to pay for and place the student in a private
school instead, the court has the authority to award tuition
reimbursement, provided that the parent demonstrates the
appropriateness of the unilateral placement.149 The Court determined
that reimbursement does not qualify as monetary damages because it
merely requires the school district to pay for programming and
services the district should have paid at the outset had it developed an
appropriate IEP for the student.150 To hold otherwise would provide
a right without a remedy.151 Recognizing the ‘‘ponderous’’152 nature of
the review process, the Court opined that a parent should not have to
keep his or her child in an inappropriate educational program.153 The
Court cautioned, however, that parents who unilaterally change their
children’s placements act at their own financial risk, as there is no
guarantee of reimbursement.154
Eight years later, in Florence County School District Four v. Carter
ex rel. Carter, the Court extended the right to tuition reimbursement
to students placed unilaterally by their parents in non-state-approved
private schools.155
The Court permitted an award of tuition
reimbursement as long as the parent demonstrated the
inappropriateness of the school district’s IEP and the appropriateness
of the private school placement.156 Subsequent rulings in the Third
148. 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 370---71.
151. See id. at 370 (finding that a ‘‘child’s right to a free appropriate education . . .
would be less than complete’’ if the court refused to allow tuition reimbursement as
an available remedy under IDEA).
152. See id. at 370.
153. See id. at 373---74.
154. See id.
155. 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).
156. See id. at 15---16.
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Circuit and Supreme Court further refined the requirements for and
restrictions on tuition reimbursement as a remedy in unilateral
placement cases. For example, the Third Circuit held that a private
placement need not be perfect, only appropriate,157 and that the
private placement does not have to develop an IEP for the student.158
With respect to restrictions on the remedy, the Third Circuit held that
a court may deny reimbursement on equitable grounds if a parent
fails to cooperate with the school district in its attempt to provide the
student with a FAPE.159
Congress codified tuition reimbursement as a remedy for the denial
of a FAPE in its 1997 amendments to the IDEA.160 The IDEA
restricts this right by permitting courts to reduce or deny
reimbursement when a parent fails to provide proper notice of intent
to unilaterally place a child in a private school and seek
reimbursement, or a parent acts unreasonably (e.g. does not
cooperate or acts in bad faith).161 Therefore, in tuition reimbursement
cases, the onus for identifying a problem’s existence and notifying the
school district of the problem rests with parents, and courts may
reduce or deny the remedy if the parent fails to adhere to these
requirements.
For those without means, tuition reimbursement has remained an
elusive remedy. Without the financial ability to pay for special
education programming and services outside the school district, lowincome families of children with disabilities had only declaratory and
injunctive relief available. While these forms of relief serve to
remediate present and future harms, they do not compensate children
with disabilities for past denials of proper programming and services.
B.

Compensatory Education

The remedy of compensatory education evolved out of the
realization that no form of recompense existed for parents unable to
‘‘front’’ the costs of unilateral placement or outside services for their

157. See Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3d Cir. 1999).
158. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 2007).
159. See C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 71---73 (3d Cir. 2010)
(holding that where parents refused to allow the District to conduct speech and
language evaluations on their child, repeatedly delayed and then failed to attend IEP
meetings, and failed to notify the District that they had unilaterally placed their child
in a private school, equitable considerations warranted the denial of tuition
reimbursement).
160. Act of June 4, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012)).
161. Id.
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children.162 It is designed to redress prior denials of a FAPE by
helping IDEA-eligible children with disabilities recoup educational
progress lost due to a school district’s delay in offering, or failure to
provide, proper educational programming and services.163
Compensatory education may take different forms, such as
afterschool instruction to a school-age student or additional
programming and services for a student beyond the age of twentyone.164
The first major case awarding compensatory education involved a
school district’s failure to provide a FAPE for three years to a child
with severe learning and behavioral issues stemming from a brain
tumor.165 The child’s family could not afford to pay for private
options.166 The Eighth Circuit extended the Burlington rationale by
requiring the school district to pay expenses it should have paid all
along had it educated the child properly.167 To support its holding, the
Eighth Circuit determined that school districts should not escape
from liability merely because a parent is unable to pay the cost of a
private education; to opine otherwise would contradict Congressional
intent and the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington.168 Thus,
compensatory education became the primary means of redress for
children denied a FAPE who remain in inappropriate educational
programs due to their parents’ financial inability to cover the costs of
private schooling and services.169
The Third Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in 1990, in
Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, reasoning that Congress ‘‘did
not intent to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an

162. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872---73 (3d Cir. 1990)
(holding that courts have the authority to grant compensatory education as a remedy,
following the rationale of the Eighth Circuit, which held that a school district should
not escape liability for providing educational programming and services to a child
with a disability simply because the parent could not provide them, as ‘‘Congress did
not intend the child’s entitlement to a free education to turn upon her parent’s ability
to ‘front’ its costs’’ (quoting Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 752---53 (8th Cir. 1986)).
163. See id. at 872.
164. See supra note 21 (defining ‘‘compensatory education’’).
165. See Miener, 800 F.2d at 751.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 753.
168. See id. at 753. The Second Circuit, in Burr v. Ambach, similarly concluded
that compensatory education was a necessary remedy under IDEA because Congress
would not have intended to ‘‘create a right without a remedy.’’ 863 F.2d 1071, 1078
(2d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Sobol v. Burr, 492
U.S. 902 (1989).
169. Some parents also may choose not to front the costs of programming and
services even if they are financially able.
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alternative private education.’’170 Numerous Third Circuit decisions
followed, further defining the contours of compensatory education as
a remedy.171 Pursuant to these decisions, a parent must demonstrate
that the IEP is not appropriate, but need not show bad faith on the
part of the school district.172 In addition, a child with a disability may
be entitled to compensatory education even if not classified
previously as eligible for special education.173 To the detriment of
parents, courts also have held that there must be a substantive
violation of the child’s right to a FAPE in order to qualify for a
compensatory education award; procedural violations alone do not
justify this remedy.174
To measure the amount of a compensatory education award, the
Third Circuit determined that a child with a disability is entitled to
receive compensatory education and related services for the duration
of the FAPE deprivation minus the reasonable time needed for the
school district to correct the problem.175 The court established that
‘‘the right to compensatory education should accrue from the point
that the school district knows or should know’’176 of the denial of a
FAPE. In doing so, the court placed the onus of identifying a FAPE
denial squarely on school districts, reasoning that ‘‘a child’s
entitlement to special education should not depend upon the vigilance
of the parents (who may not be sufficiently sophisticated to
comprehend the problem).’’177
In essence, over the last twenty years, a parent’s socioeconomic
status has become the primary factor determining which of the two
equitable remedies------tuition reimbursement or compensatory
education------a parent may access. Although courts have used both
remedies widely throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Congress elected to
codify only the former. In fact, the only reference to compensatory
services as a remedy appears in the IDEA 2004 federal implementing
regulations as a potential remedy within a state’s internal complaint

170. See Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990).
171. See, e.g., Michael P. ex rel. P.P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727,
738 (3d Cir. 2009); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249---50
(3d Cir. 1998); Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F. 3d 520, 537 (3d Cir. 1995).
172. See Scott P., 62 F.3d at 537.
173. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 249---50.
174. See P.P., 585 F.3d at 738.
175. See M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir.
1996).
176. Id. at 396---97 (emphasis added); see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v.
Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250.
177. M.C., 81 F.3d at 397.
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resolution process.178 Congress’ failure to codify compensatory
education as an available remedy, while devoting significant attention
to the rights and responsibilities of parents and children with
disabilities unilaterally placed in private school, relegates
compensatory education to a second class status with significant
implications. Foremost, because the Act does not list compensatory
education as a remedy, school districts have no duty to include it in
the procedural safeguards or other materials they distribute to
parents.179 As set forth in Part I, parents rely on procedural
safeguards to understand the special education system and their
rights. As a result, many do not even know this remedy exists.180
Moreover, children unilaterally placed by their parents in private
schools presumably receive a FAPE immediately following
placement, giving them an ‘‘immediacy of benefits’’181 unavailable to
students for whom compensatory education is the only available
remedy. As a result, children with disabilities living in low-income
households are forced to remain in allegedly inappropriate
educational programs, at times for years, pending the dispute

178. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b)(1) (2013) (‘‘In resolving a complaint in which the
[state educational agency] has found a failure to provide appropriate services, a[]
[state educational agency] . . . must address------(1) The failure to provide appropriate
services, including corrective action appropriate to address the needs of the child
(such as compensatory services or monetary reimbursement) . . . .’’). The 1999
version of the federal regulations provided an award of monetary reimbursement or
‘‘other corrective action appropriate to the needs of the child’’ as remedies for the
denial of appropriate services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.660(b) (1999). The 1999 version
further directed that a complaint must allege a violation that occurred
not more than one year prior to the date that the complaint is
received . . . unless a longer period is reasonable because the violation is
continuing, or the complainant is requesting compensatory services for a
violation that occurred not more than three years prior to the date the
complaint is received.
34 C.F.R. § 300.662 (1999, repealed 2006); see Doug Goldberg, OSEP Letter to
Margaret Kohn, 17 EHLR 522 (1990), SPECIAL EDUC. ADVISOR (July 10, 1990),
http://www.specialeducationadvisor.com/osep-letter-to-margaret-kohn-17-ehlr-5221990 (providing that compensatory education is an appropriate means to remedy a
prior FAPE denial, and adding, ‘‘Further, compensatory education may be the only
means through which children forced to remain in an inappropriate placement due to
their parents’ financial inability to pay for an appropriate private placement would
receive FAPE.’’).
179. See Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 129---30.
180. See id.
181. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Post Forest Grove Parental Reimbursement for Private

School Placements: What about Parents Who Cannot Afford the Cost of Such
Placements?, 292 EDUC. LAW REP. 1, 20 (2013).
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resolution process,182 ‘‘leaving less time to close gaps left open or
widened by the denial of FAPE.’’183 These children often do not
recoup this critical education and development time, no matter the
quality or quantity of services courts award on the back end.184
Furthermore, disparities exist in measuring these two remedies.
Courts typically calculate and award tuition reimbursement based on
years spent in the private placement while measuring compensatory
education in terms of service hours or days of instruction missed, 185
resulting in, at times, a significantly reduced award. As children with
disabilities in low-income households disproportionately rely on
compensatory education as their sole remedy for the denial of a
FAPE, they suffer the most from the adverse effects of this secondclass cure.
III. APPLICATION OF THE IDEA 2004’S STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS TO COMPENSATORY EDUCATION CLAIMS IN THE
THIRD CIRCUIT
As this Part demonstrates, the last decade has brought a marked
change in the Third Circuit’s approach to compensatory education as
a remedy. Recent opinions indicate misapplication and excessively
restrictive interpretation of the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations
provision and its exceptions. These decisions exhibit a 180-degree
shift in Third Circuit courts’ approach to remedies under the IDEA,
and unfairly limit the remedial options available to children from lowincome households.
A. Timelines for Filing Special Education Claims Pre-IDEA
2004
Prior to the 2004 amendments, the IDEA did not impose any time
limits on bringing special education administrative level claims or civil
actions. To counter this omission, the Third Circuit issued several
decisions during the 1990s delineating parameters for the time period

182. See Seligmann & Zirkel supra note 18, at 299 (‘‘[I]t remains true that from the
start of a dispute to its final resolution, much time can elapse especially during a court
proceeding.’’). Additionally, in my experience, I have seen several examples of cases
taking more than two years to make it through the administrative hearing process
alone, not including appeal.
183. Seligmann & Zirkel, supra note 18, at 296.
184. See generally supra Part I.
185. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 896.
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in which a claim may be filed.186 In so doing, the court took divergent
positions in tuition reimbursement suits and compensatory education
actions regarding the timeframe for filing a complaint, the
responsibility for identifying a FAPE denial, and the starting point for
the accrual of a claim.
As to the timeframe for filing a complaint seeking tuition
reimbursement, the Third Circuit in Bernardsville Board of
Education v. J.H. held that a parent’s failure to initiate administrative
grievance procedures more than one year following unilateral
placement ‘‘without mitigating excuse . . . is an unreasonable delay.’’187
The court based its decision on the rationale that school districts are
entitled to notice, in the form of initiation of review proceedings
within a reasonable time, of a parent’s intent to unilaterally place a
child and seek reimbursement.188 Such notice allows the district to
determine whether it should continue to review and revise the IEP:
‘‘[T]he right of review contains a corresponding parental duty to
unequivocally place in issue the appropriateness of an IEP.’’189
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Ridgewood refused to extend the
statute of limitations on tuition reimbursement claims to the filing of
first level (administrative) compensatory education claims.190 The
court held that any time limits on the filing of compensatory
education claims did not accrue until after administrative proceedings
had concluded.191 Due to the IDEA’s requirement that parents
exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a claim in state or
federal court,192 compensatory education claims typically escaped
application of time limits on filing to the benefit of parents.
In the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, Congress added notice
requirements and conditions on reimbursement, effectively placing
the duty to identify a FAPE denial on parents in tuition

186. See, e.g., Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1994)
(discussing, in 1994, the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the appropriate timeframe
for filing a tuition reimbursement claim); see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex
rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250---51 (3d Cir. 1999) (discussing, in 1999, the Third Circuit’s
interpretation of the statute of limitations for compensatory education claims).
187. J.H., 42 F.3d at 158.
188. See id. at 158.
189. Id. at 162.
190. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250.
191. See id. at 251; see also Jeremy H. ex rel. Hunter v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist.,
95 F.3d 272, 280---81 (3d Cir. 1996).
192. See Jeremy H., 95 F.3d at 281 (citing the IDEA’s mandate that an aggrieved
party must exhaust the state’s administrative procedures prior to bringing an IDEA
claim in state or federal court, unless doing so would be futile).
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reimbursement cases.193 For example, a court may limit or deny
reimbursement if a parent fails to inform the school district, at the last
IEP meeting, of his intent to place the child in a private school and
seek reimbursement, or does not provide written notice to the school
district ten business days before the child’s removal.194 As long as a
parent complies with the IDEA’s notice requirements, the child’s
start date at the unilateral placement becomes the starting point for
the accrual of the tuition reimbursement claim.195
As explained in Part II above, the Third Circuit placed the duty to
identify problems with the identification, evaluation, placement, and
provision of a FAPE exclusively on school districts in actions
involving compensatory education.196 ‘‘[I]t is the responsibility of the
child’s teachers, therapists, and administrators------and of the
multidisciplinary team that annually evaluates the student’s
progress------to ascertain the child’s educational needs, respond to
deficiencies, and place him or her accordingly.’’197 The vesting of this
responsibility squarely in school districts coincided with the IDEA’s
mandates: given that school districts have an affirmative duty to
identify, evaluate, and provide a FAPE to all eligible children,198 by
extension, they also have a duty to identify situations in which they
have failed to provide a FAPE. Following this rationale, the Third
Circuit determined that a compensatory education claim accrues from
the time that the school district knows, or should have known, of the
FAPE denial.199

193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2012); see also, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen
Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 72 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that parents acted unreasonably by
failing to notify the school district in a timely manner of their intent to seek tuition
reimbursement for the unilateral placement of their child in a private school, and
therefore denying the parents’ reimbursement claim).
194. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I). But see § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) (excusing a parent
from the notice requirement if he is illiterate and cannot write English, if compliance
would cause physical or serious emotional harm to the child, or if the school
prevented the parent from giving notice).
195. See generally § 1412(a)(10)(C).
196. See M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir. 1996);
see also Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir.
1999).
197. M.C., 81 F.3d at 397.
198. See § 1412(a)(1), (3) (describing states’ duty to ensure that a FAPE is
available to all children with disabilities ages three to twenty-one and requiring that
all children with disabilities be identified, located, and evaluated for special education
eligibility).
199. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396; see also Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis,
480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007); Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250---51.
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The Third Circuit’s disparate positions on time limits for filing
claims and determining when claims accrue in tuition reimbursement
and compensatory education matters are solidly grounded in logic.
Filing requirements such as parental notice and time limits for tuition
reimbursement claims are common sense, because the school district
may be held responsible for paying substantial sums of money
retroactively (and often, once the decision is rendered,
prospectively).200 For this reason, the Third Circuit, and Congress in
the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, permitted reduction and even
denial of tuition reimbursement in the event a parent acts
unreasonably or in bad faith.201 Notably, however, the Third Circuit
did not place prior notice requirements and time limits on first-level
compensatory education claims. In compensatory education matters,
school districts are not placed in the same position of risk,202 for
children typically remain in their same allegedly inappropriate
educational program for the duration of the dispute, and remedies
come in the form of additional future programming and services.203
Some have posited that these disparate positions stem from ad-hoc
decision-making,204 proposing that the only difference between the
two remedies lies in a parent’s election of which one to choose------‘‘the
financial risk of a unilateral private placement . . . [or] forego[ing] this
risk [and awaiting] the outcome of the Act’s ‘ponderous’ review
process.’’205 Those espousing this view fail to recognize that, for
families without means, no choice exists.
This Article proposes the contrary view, namely that the Third
Circuit intentionally employed distinct approaches. The court’s
opinions resulted from recognition that while tuition reimbursement
and compensatory education are both equitable remedies that stem
200. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 895---96 (describing the parent’s ‘‘high stakes
unilateral action’’ in tuition reimbursement cases as ‘‘warranting clear notice to the
district of its last-chance opportunity to have the IEP team to resolve the matter, thus
avoiding the mutual risk of undue costs’’).
201. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III); see also, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen
Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 72 (3d Cir. 2010) (denying tuition reimbursement due to
parents’ unreasonable conduct).
202. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 896 (describing the level of risk as ‘‘less acute’’ in
matters regarding compensatory education)
203. But see Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist., 595 F. Supp. 2d 566, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(noting that in past disputes between the parties regarding compensatory education,
the school district created a trust fund in the amount of over $200,000 to be used for
compensatory education and related services).
204. See Zirkel, supra note 17, at 893 (describing the Third Circuit’s disparate
treatment of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education as an ‘‘ad hoc
framework’’).
205. Id. at 894.
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from the IDEA’s ‘‘broad grant for appropriate relief’’ and ‘‘are
premised on a denial of the eligible child’s entitlement to FAPE,’’206
they differ substantially in their availability, application and effects.
As such, they require disparate treatment.207
B. Courts’ Misapplication and Overly Restrictive Interpretation
of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of Limitations and its Exceptions in
Compensatory Education Matters
The Third Circuit’s distinct treatment of the remedies of tuition
reimbursement and compensatory education persisted until the
implementation of the 2004 IDEA amendments, when Congress
added a statute of limitations to the Act.208 The statute of limitations
sets a time limit on the filing of claims regarding special education
identification, evaluation, placement, or the provision of a FAPE.209
The amended IDEA provides, in pertinent part:
(C) Timeline for requesting hearing. A parent or agency shall
request an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date
the parent or agency knew or should have known about the alleged
action that forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an

206. See id. at 894.
207. Disparate treatment of tuition reimbursement and compensatory education
claims is not unique to the Third Circuit. Although the IDEA did not include a
statute of limitations prior to the 2004 amendments, the U.S. Department of
Education (DOE), in the IDEA’s implementing regulations, distinguished the two
remedies in terms of the timing for filing claims. Following codification of tuition
reimbursement as a remedy in 1997, the DOE included statute of limitations
language in the 1999 regulations, in a reference to state complaint procedures. The
regulations stated that a complaint must allege a violation occurring ‘‘not more than
one year prior to the date that the complaint is received . . . unless a longer period is
reasonable because the violation is continuing, or the complainant is requesting
compensatory services for a violation that occurred not more than three years prior
to the date the complaint is received.’’ 34 C.F.R. § 300.662 (repealed 2006). In
addition, rather than treat these remedies similarly, Congress opted not to codify
compensatory education in either the 1997 or the 2004 amendments while including
detailed language regarding tuition reimbursement, see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10),
despite the fact that courts had been awarding compensatory education in special
education matters for more than twenty years.
208. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)---(D) (2012).
209. See § 1415(b)(6), (f)(3)(C)---(D); see also Lynn M. Daggett et al., For Whom

the School Bell Tolls but not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717, 722 (2005) (defining
statutes of limitations as serving many purposes, including ‘‘imposing finality on the
litigation system, giving potential defendants an end to their potential liability, and
avoiding litigation of disputes involving stale evidence’’).
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explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing under this
subchapter, in such time as the State law allows.210

The Act delineates two exceptions to the timeline:
(D) Exceptions to the timeline. The timeline described in
subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the parent was
prevented from requesting the hearing due to-----(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it
had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency’s withholding of information from
the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to
the parent.211

Congress also amended the procedural safeguards section
concerning the opportunity for a party to file a complaint, requiring
that that states establish and maintain procedures including:
(6) An opportunity for any party to present a complaint-----(A) with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of
a free appropriate public education to such child; and
(B) which sets forth an alleged violation that occurred not more
than 2 years before the date the parent or public agency knew or
should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of
the complaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for
presenting such a complaint under this subchapter, in such time as
the State law allows, except that the exceptions to the timeline
described in subsection (f)(3)(D) shall apply to the timeline
described in this subparagraph.212

The new statutory language superseded the Third Circuit’s decision
in Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H.213 by creating a two-year
statutory time limit on reimbursement filings. It also overrode
portions of the court’s earlier decision in Ridgewood214 by
implementing a statute of limitations on the filing of compensatory
education claims at the administrative level. Litigation following
implementation of this new provision initially focused on retroactive

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

§ 1415(f)(3)(C).
§ 1415(f)(3)(D)(i)---(ii).
§ 1415(b)(6).
42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 1994).
172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).
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application of the statute to claims arising prior to the IDEA 2004’s
passage but filed after the Act’s effective date.215
In the last few years, the focus of litigation in Third Circuit courts
has shifted to the application of the statute of limitations to
compensatory education claims and parsing out the provision’s
exceptions.
These recent federal district and appellate court
decisions, discussed in detail below, demonstrate courts’ confusion
and resultant misapplication of the statute of limitations, and their
overly restrictive interpretation of the exceptions. The decisions
further constrict the availability of compensatory education as a
remedy, to the particular detriment of low-income children with
disabilities, and exhibit an almost complete reversal in the Third
Circuit’s prior broad approach to compensatory education claims.

1.

Application of the IDEA 2004’s Statute of Limitations

In applying the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations, Third Circuit
courts err in two respects, both of which result in improper
restrictions on the consideration of compensatory education claims.
First, several courts misstate the statute of limitations as limiting
compensatory education claims to actions that occurred no more than
two years prior to the date the complaint was filed.216 Second, some
courts, while properly tolling the statute of limitations from the date
the plaintiff knew or should have known about the alleged action
forming the basis of the complaint (hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘knew or should have known’’ date or ‘‘KOSHK’’ date), erroneously
restrict consideration of compensatory education claims to a
maximum of two years prior to the KOSHK date, regardless of the
actual scope and duration of the claim.217 The first restriction reflects
a misreading of the statute, while the second reflects statutory

215. See, e.g., Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., No. 07-4990, 2008 WL
4791634 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (concluding that the statute of limitations applies to
claims filed after the Act’s effective date, even if based on actions occurring prior to
the enactment of IDEA 2004). In 2010 the Third Circuit resolved the retroactivity
issue in Steven I. v. Central Bucks School District, holding that the statute of
limitations applies to claims filed after the Act’s effective date for actions and
violations occurring prior to the effective date. 618 F.3d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 2010).
216. See, e.g., H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822 F. Supp. 2d
439, 446---47 (D.N.J. 2011); see also D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d
Cir. 2012); Munir v. Pottsville Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:10---cv---0855, 2012 WL 2194543,
at *12 n.6 (M.D. Pa. June 14, 2012), aff’d, 723 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 2013).
217. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012); see also G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *19---20 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013).
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misinterpretation and contravenes the plain meaning of the statute,
the legislative history of the Act,218 and Third Circuit precedent.

a. Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of Compensatory
Education Claims to Two Years Prior to the Date the Complaint Was
Filed
As previously stated, the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations, set
forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C), requires a party to file a complaint
within two years of the date the parent or public agency knew or
should have known about the alleged action219 that forms the basis of
the complaint. Several courts, however, (in dicta) have misread §
1415(f)(3)(C) together with § 1415(b)(6)(B) (procedural safeguard
concerning the filing of a complaint) as barring courts from
adjudicating any IDEA claims that occurred more than two years
prior to the date the petition was filed.220 For example, in H.M. ex rel.
B.M., v. Haddon Heights Board of Education, the court incorrectly
states that because the plaintiffs filed their petition on June 5, 2008,
they could seek recovery only for claims arising after June 5, 2006,221
two years prior to the date of filing (as opposed to the KOSHK date).
The court similarly errs in L.G. and E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon
School District, stating, ‘‘Under IDEA’s amended statute of
limitations, a court may consider alleged denials of a FAPE occurring
for a two-year period prior to parents’ request for a due process
218. See generally S. REP. NO. 108-185 (2003).
219. Courts define ‘‘action’’ as the date the plaintiff learned or should have learned
of the injury, as opposed to the date the plaintiff knew the conduct of the school
district was actionable. See, e.g., Centennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D. ex rel. Daniel D., No.
10-CV-4129, 2011 WL 6117278, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2011) (finding the statute of
limitations accrues on plaintiff’s knowledge of the injury and not plaintiff’s
knowledge of the law); see also Bantum v. Sch. Dist., No. 10-4195, 2011 WL 1303312,
at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011) (‘‘[P]laintiff has two years from the date she learned
or should have learned of her injury to request that the School District provide her
with a due process hearing.’’).
220. See, e.g., H.M., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 446---47 (confirming that where plaintiffs
filed their petition on June 5, 2008, they could seek recovery for claims that arose up
to two years prior, i.e., June 5, 2006); see also D.K., 696 F.3d at 244 (noting that
plaintiffs’ claims are restricted to conduct following January 8, 2006, two years prior
to the January 8, 2008 date plaintiffs filed their initial due process petition); Munir,
2012 WL 2194543, at *12 n.6 (noting that the court will not consider any claim arising
prior to August 12, 2007 where the plaintiff filed the petition for due process on
August 12, 2009); L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06---0333,
06---3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011) (‘‘Under IDEA’s amended
statute of limitations, a court may consider alleged denials of a FAPE occurring for a
two-year period prior to parents’ request for a due process hearing.’’).
221. See H.M., 822 F. Supp. 2d at 446---47 (barring consideration of testimony that
supported claims predating two years prior to the date of filing).
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hearing.’’222 Significantly, the Third Circuit, in D.K. v. Abington
School District, reinforces this misreading of the statute when it
states, ‘‘Plaintiffs do not dispute that because they requested a due
process hearing on January 8, 2008, the statute of limitations
generally would limit their claims to the School District’s conduct
after January 8, 2006.’’223
Even if the courts read § 1415(f)(3)(C) together with §
1415(b)(6)(B), and interpreted the language as restricting
adjudication of all compensatory education claims regardless of their
scope or duration (a proposition that this Article does not advocate,
except for illustrative purposes only), courts would have to consider,
at the very least, all claims arising during the two years prior to the
KOSHK date,224 not the date of filing the petition.225 To illustrate the
distinction, consider a parent who learns of an ongoing FAPE
violation causing harm to his child on January 1, 2010 (the KOSHK
date) and the violation had occurred in a continuous manner for three
years prior to that time. If the parent files a complaint within the twoyear statute of limitations period (i.e., by January 1, 2012), he should
be permitted to date the claim for compensatory education at least as
far back as January 1, 2008, two years prior to the KOSHK date. One
court recently referred to this interpretation as the ‘‘2+2’’ analysis:
‘‘[I]t allows two years after the KOSHK date for a plaintiff to file a
due process complaint, and the period of up to two years before the
KOSHK date for which [sic] plaintiffs may allege IDEA violations
occurred,’’ allowing courts to consider, at most, a four-year IDEA
claim.226 In contrast, according to the H.M. and L.G. opinions, the
parent could date the claim back to January 1, 2010 only (two years
prior to the date of filing), which would deprive the child of two
additional years of compensatory education. Although the courts’

222. L.G., 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (improperly stating the rule when discussing
whether the IDEA’s statute of limitations replaces the equitable limitations imposed
before 2004) (emphasis added); see also Munir, 2012 WL 2194543, at *12 n.6 (stating,
in dicta, that the court will not consider any claim arising prior to August 12, 2007
where the plaintiff filed the petition for due process on August 12, 2009).
223. D.K., 696 F.3d at 244.
224. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2012).
225. The propriety of this strict interpretation, presented for hypothetical purposes
only, is highly questionable, although at least one district court has followed this
rationale. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that plaintiff’s compensatory education claims
arising before June 8, 2008 are barred where the parent’s ‘‘knew or should have
known’’ date was found to be June 8, 2010).
226. See G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *10---11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013).
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erroneous reading of the statute of limitations in these cases had no
direct bearing on the resolution of the issues being litigated, it creates
confusion and misleads other courts227 and the public.228

b.

Courts Improperly Restrict Adjudication of Compensatory
Education Claims to Two Years Prior to the KOSHK Date
Regardless of the Scope of the Claim

Courts’ application of ‘‘2+2’’ analysis creates further confusion
regarding the interrelationship of § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B)
and their application to compensatory education claims. Relying on
‘‘2+2’’ analysis, Third Circuit courts restrict consideration of
compensatory education claims, and thus the scope of awards, to the
two-year period prior to the KOSHK date, regardless of whether the
claim began more than two years prior but was ongoing up to and
during the two-year period and timely filed.229 As discussed below,
these decisions contradict the plain meaning of the relevant statutory
provisions, evince a misinterpretation of the statute, contravene the
legislative history of the IDEA, and negate years of Third Circuit
precedent.
Lower courts in two recent cases misconstrue the interplay of §
1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) as preventing courts from hearing
any claims that predate the two-year period prior to the KOSHK
date. In I.H. v. Cumberland Valley School District, the parent filed a
petition, on August 25, 2010, seeking compensatory education for her
child dating back to March 2007, three years prior.230 The hearing
officer determined that the parent’s KOSHK date for purposes of the

227. See, e.g., id. at *19---20 (concluding that the hearing officer made an error of
law when it held plaintiff’s claims for relief were limited to the two years prior to the
date the petition was filed, but certifying the issue for interlocutory appeal to the
Third Circuit on the question of the proper statutory interpretation and application
of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) together with § 1415(b)(6)(B)). Significantly, no other
federal court of appeals has addressed this issue to date.
228. For example, in recent years the attorneys in the Education and Health Law
Clinic have heard numerous mediators, administrative law judges and legal counsel
for boards of education assert that a child cannot receive an award of more than two
years of compensatory education under the statute of limitations, regardless of case
circumstances.
229. See G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13---15; see also I.H., 842 F. Supp.
2d at 773---74.
230. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774 (limiting consideration of claims regarding the
denial of a FAPE to those occurring for a two-year period prior to the parents’
KOSHK date).
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statute of limitations was June 8, 2010,231 and thus limited the
compensatory education claim to June 8, 2008, two years prior.232 The
district court affirmed, reasoning that while § 1415(f)(3)(C) controls
the limitations period for filing an action, § 1415(b)(6)(B) ‘‘provides a
limitations period for the scope of the action, that is, which alleged
violations or harms may be included in the complaint.’’233 The court
in G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District, guided by the I.H. decision,
similarly concluded that § 1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B) should
be read separately, defining the former as a time limit on filing for a
hearing, and the latter as a ‘‘look-back’’ period for purposes of
liability.234 Both courts espouse that the two-year ‘‘limitations period
for the scope of the action,’’235 or ‘‘look-back’’ period,236 precludes
courts from adjudicating any IDEA claims for actions that occurred
more than two years before the KOSHK date even if they were
ongoing to the two-year period.237
As explained above, § 1415(f)(3)(C) is the IDEA’s statute of
limitations provision and sets a two-year timeline from the KOSHK
date to request a hearing. If a parent waits more than two years after
the KOSHK date to request a hearing, and the opposing side raises
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, the court will
time-bar the claim unless the parent meets one of the delineated
exceptions.238 In contrast, § 1415(b)(6)(B) is found in the procedural
safeguards section of the IDEA and details the content of a
complaint. Section 1415(b)(6)(B) provides, in relevant part, that any
party may present a complaint alleging a violation that occurred not
more than two years prior to the KOSHK date.239 Significantly, the
plain language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) does not expressly limit the
duration or scope of the claims, provided the complaint alleges a
violation that occurred within the two-year period. As such, if a
timely filed complaint sets forth a violation that occurred in the twoyear period before KOSHK date, but the claim commenced prior to
the two-year period and was ongoing, nothing in the language of the

231. Id. (noting that the parties agreed that the date the parent had learned, from
an independent evaluation paid for by the district, that the child was not receiving a
FAPE was the ‘‘knew or should have known date’’).
232. See id.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. See G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13---15.
235. I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
236. G.L., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13.
237. See id. at *14---15; see also I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
238. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C)---(D) (2012).
239. § 1415(b)(6)(B).
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IDEA restricts courts from adjudicating the claim in its entirety. To
interpret the IDEA as foreclosing courts’ adjudication of such timely
filed, ongoing claims defies the plain language of § 1415(b)(6)(B)
even when read together with § 1415(f)(3)(C)---(D), and contradicts
the legislative history of the Act (as discussed in greater detail below).
Moreover, this interpretation, advanced by the I.H. and G.L. courts,
creates a right without a remedy, in contravention to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinions in Burlington240 and, more recently, in
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.241
In defining § 1415(b)(6)(B) as a limitation on the scope or duration
of claims, the I.H. and G.L. courts appear to interpret the provision
not as an extension or restatement of the statute of limitations set
forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), but rather as a jurisdictional limitation on
courts’ ability to hear IDEA claims.242 This distinction is critical.
When a filing requirement is deemed jurisdictional, it cannot be
modified, and plaintiff noncompliance with the requirement results in
an absolute bar to consideration of the claims.243 In contrast, the
Third Circuit considers a statute of limitations an affirmative defense
and subject to equitable modifications.244
To determine if a statutory provision is jurisdictional, courts look
to congressional intent by considering the language, legislative
history, and purpose of the statute.245 Factors considered include
whether the provision explicitly uses the term ‘‘jurisdiction,’’ whether
it appears in the same section as the statute of limitations or in the
statutory section on jurisdiction, and whether it is subject to
modification.246 Here, the two-year time limit in § 1415(b)(6)(B)

240. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985)
(explaining that ‘‘by empowering the court to grant ‘appropriate’ relief Congress
meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy’’ and
to find other otherwise would make a ‘‘child’s right to a free and appropriate public
education . . . less than complete.’’
241. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 238 (2009) (‘‘[A]bsent any
indication to the contrary, what relief is ‘appropriate’ must be determined in light of
the Act’s broad purpose of providing children with disabilities a FAPE . . . .’’); see
also Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 527 (2007) (‘‘[T]he Act does
not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights
accorded to them . . . . Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive
parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.’’).
242. Notably, neither court addresses the jurisdictional issue directly.
243. See Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617---18 (3d Cir. 1998).
244. See id. at 618.
245. See id.
246. See id.; see also Wall Twshp. Bd. of Educ. v. C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d 487, 493
(D.N.J. 2008).
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appears to have ‘‘jurisdictional significance’’247 by virtue of its
placement in the statute. Nevertheless, this significance is diminished
for several reasons. First, Congress refers to the limitation as a ‘‘time
limitation,’’248 not a jurisdictional limitation. Second, the limitation
does not appear in the section of the IDEA that confers jurisdiction
on the courts, namely § 1415(i)(3). Finally, and most importantly, §
1415(b)(6)(B) permits states to disregard the two-year limit in favor
of their own time prescriptions, undermining any arguments that
Congress intended that the provision be jurisdictional.249 ‘‘Time
prescriptions created by state laws cannot be jurisdictional because
‘[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.’’’250 Therefore, courts should accord the two-year time
limit set forth in § 1415(b)(6)(B) no jurisdictional significance.
Since § 1415(b)(6)(B) cannot be considered jurisdictional, the
purpose and significance of the provision remain in question. Third
Circuit courts in L.G. and D.K. refer generally to the ‘‘statute of
limitations’’ as justification for restricting the scope of IDEA claims
to two years prior to the date of filing the petition251 (courts’ incorrect
tolling of the statute of limitations to the date of filing the petition is
discussed at length above). If Congress intended that courts treat §
1415(b)(6)(B) as merely a restatement of the statute of limitations set
forth at § 1415(f)(3)(C), the time limit may be pled as an affirmative
defense only, and cannot serve as a jurisdictional bar that limits the
scope of claims.252 This interpretation of the statutory language

247. See C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
248. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (distinguishing between jurisdictional limitations
and statutes of limitations).
249. C.f. C.M., 534 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (finding that the IDEA’s ninety-day appeals
timeline set forth at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B) (2012) is not jurisdictional because the
statute permits states to disregard the timeline and create their own, whereas only
Congress may determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts).
250. Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 217 (2007)). It should also be noted
that the G.L. court’s reliance on other federal statutes, including look-back
provisions, is misplaced, because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, cited in
G.L. as an example, has a look-back provision that cannot be modified by the states,
whereas the IDEA provision at issue here can be so modified. Compare 20 U.S.C. §
1415(b)(6)(B) (2012) (directing that state-imposed time limits for ‘‘presenting [a]
complaint’’ supersede the two-year time limit delineated in the Statute), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2012) (directing that back-pay liability for employers, under
Title VII, ‘‘shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a
charge,’’ yet not allowing for consideration of state-imposed time restrictions).
251. See L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06---0333, 06--3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011). See generally D.K. v.
Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012).
252. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 617---18.
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coincides with the Third Circuit’s finding that statutes of limitation
‘‘regulate secondary conduct, i.e., the filing of a suit, not primary
conduct, i.e., the actions that gave rise to the suit.’’253
While much of the language of § 1415(b)(6)(B) mimics §
1415(f)(3)(C), supporting the statutory interpretation that the former
provision merely restates the latter, some differences exist.254.
Interestingly, in the first House Report proposing amendments to the
IDEA as part of the 2004 reauthorization process, the only time limit
on IDEA claims appears in the procedural safeguards section later
codified in § 1415(b)(6)(B).255 The Report provides that states must
have procedures including an opportunity to present complaints,
which ‘‘set forth a violation that occurred not more than one year
before the complaint is filed.’’256 In the comments to the Report,
Congress refers to this new language as a ‘‘statute of limitations,’’
stating that ‘‘[t]he bill includes a statute of limitations of one year
from the date of the violation.’’257 Thus, Congress appears to be
stating the same proposition in two different ways------a complaint must
set forth a violation that occurred no more than one year prior to the
date a parent files, and a parent must file a complaint within one year
of the date of the violation.
The later Senate Report adds specific statute of limitations
language, subsequently codified in § 1415(f)(3)(C), and amends the §
1415(b)(6)(B) language in what appears to be an attempt to make the
two provisions consistent.258 In so doing, the Senate replaces the oneyear time limit referenced in the House Report with a two-year
limit.259 The Senate also changes the date for tolling the statute of
limitations from the date of filing a complaint to the KOSHK date.260

253. Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 618 F.3d 411, 414 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010).
254. Compare, e.g., § 1415(b)(6)(B) (‘‘The procedures required by this section shall
include . . . an opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . which sets forth an
alleged violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or
public agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the
basis of the complaint . . . .’’), with § 1415(f)(3)(C) (‘‘A parent or agency shall request
an impartial due process hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew
or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the
complaint . . . .’’).
255. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-77, at 36 (2003).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 116.
258. Compare S. REP NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003), with § 1415(f)(3)(C), and §
1415(b)(6)(B).
259. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-77 at 36, with S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40.
260. Compare H.R. REP. NO. 108-77 at 36 (2003), with § 1415(f)(3)(C), and §
1415(b)(6)(B).
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This change in the tolling date significantly alters the interrelationship
of the two provisions. To illustrate, requiring that the complaint set
forth a violation that occurred no more than two years prior to the
date of filing, and requiring that a complaint be filed within two years
of the date a violation occurred, is to state the same two-year time
limitation in different ways. In contrast, requiring that a complaint
set forth a violation that occurred no more than two years prior to the
KOSHK, and requiring that a complaint be filed within two years of
the KOSHK date, creates two potentially very different timeframes.261
Notably, the Senate Report comments neither refer to §
1415(b)(6)(B) nor define the provision’s purpose apart from their
discussion of the statute of limitations in § 1415(f)(3)(C).262 This leads
one to posit that Congress, when adding the language of §
1415(f)(3)(C) and changing the date and time period for tolling in §
1415(b)(6)(B) to coincide with § 1415(f)(3)(C), may have intended §
1415(b)(6)(B) to serve as nothing more than a restatement (or
elaboration) of, the statute of limitations, with no (or limited)
separate weight or effect.263
Courts’ confusion regarding the language and purpose of §
1415(b)(6)(B) and its relationship with § 1415(f)(3)(C) provides a
valid basis for examining the IDEA’s legislative history to ascertain
Congress’s intent.264 The legislative history plainly reveals that
Congress did not intend to limit the scope of ongoing compensatory
education claims as long as such claims were timely filed:
This new provision is not intended to alter the principle under
IDEA that children may receive compensatory education
services . . . First, the statute of limitations will bar consideration of

261. Compare § 1415(b)(6)(B) with § 1415(f)(3)(C).
262. See generally S. REP. NO. 108-185.
263. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 242 (2009) (finding that
several statutory clauses within IDEA were not restrictive or exclusive and instead,
were ‘‘best read as elaborating on the general rule that courts may order
reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that
may effect a reimbursement award.’’).
264. A court may examine the legislative history of a statute where the statutory
language is inconclusive or ambiguous. See Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Office of
Thrift Supervision, 963 F.2d 567, 578 (3d Cir. 1992) (examining the legislative history
of the statute in question where the statutory language was found to be ‘‘not
conclusive’’); see also United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical
Labs., 149 F.3d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the statute at issue was not
ambiguous, and declining, therefore, to consider the legislative history behind the
statute’s passage in the court’s opinion). But see G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist.
Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30,
2013) (concluding that the plain meanings of § 1415(b)(6)(B) and § 1415(f)(3)(C) are
clear such that the court need not examine statutory purpose or legislative history).
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claims where: (1) the allegation relates to conduct or services that
are more than two years prior to the commencement of due process
on the basis of that conduct or those services, or upon the unilateral
placement of the child in a private school or with a private service
provider, and (2) during that two year period, either (a) the services
are not alleged to have been at cost or inappropriate, or (b) the
conduct is not alleged to have been appropriate. In essence, where

the issue giving rise to the claim is more than two years old and not
ongoing, the claim is barred; where the conduct or services at issue
are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory
education services may be made on the basis of the most recent
conduct or services and the conduct or services that were more than
two years old . . . at the time of the due process or the private
placement.265
To illustrate the distinction between ‘‘2+2’’ analysis and what
Congress intended, per the legislative history, consider again the
example described above of the parent who learns of a FAPE
violation causing harm to his child on January 1, 2010 (the KOSHK
date), and seeks compensatory education as a remedy. The violation
commenced three years prior to the KOSHK date (on January 1,
2007), and was ongoing for at least three years. Following ‘‘2+2’’
analysis, the parent cannot pursue any claims for actions occurring
more than two years prior to the KOSHK date. As a result the child
loses the right to an entire year of compensatory education.
Following the legislative history of the IDEA, however, the parent
can pursue claims for the full three years prior to the KOSHK date
because the violation was ongoing up until and through the two-year
period prior to the KOSHK date.
The legislative history here coincides with Third Circuit precedent,
as aptly expressed by the court in Robert R. v. Marple Newton School
District: ‘‘[T]he limitations period placed on claims for compensatory
education by the 2005 amendment to the IDEA was not meant to
limit the period which the hearing officer could consider when a due
process hearing was timely brought.’’266 Significantly, several lower
courts in the Third Circuit reiterated this ‘‘broad approach to a child’s
entitlement to compensatory education’’ claims267 in the years
immediately following implementation of IDEA 2004, and again as

265. S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003) (emphasis added).
266. Robert R. v. Marple Newton Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 05-1282, 2005 WL
3003033, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2005) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. NO. 108185, at 41 (supporting consideration of ongoing compensatory education claims as
long as they are timely filed).
267. Id.
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recently as 2013.268 Furthermore, the legislative history aligns with
U.S. Supreme Court precedent barring restrictive interpretation of
the IDEA where conflicting congressional intent exists,269 and
mandating that parents have an adequate remedy to redress the
denial of a FAPE.270
Finally, Third Circuit courts’ recent decisions limiting the scope of
compensatory education claims to the two years prior to the plaintiff’s
KOSHK date271 negate years of precedent concerning the accrual of
compensatory education claims.272 As discussed in Part II, the date
that a school district knew or should have known of a FAPE violation
determines when a compensatory education claim accrues, and is the
starting point for measuring the claim’s scope or duration, i.e., the
FAPE denial.273 More recent cases, however, erroneously shift the
duty to identify a FAPE denial from school districts to parents (as
plaintiffs).274 Consider the following example to better understand
the effects of this shift. If a school district knows or should have
known of its failure to provide a FAPE to a student in 2007, but the

268. See, e.g., Central Sch. Dist. v. K.C., Civil Action No. 11---6869, 2013 WL
3367484, at *12 n.6 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2013) (‘‘We also agree with the conclusion
reached by several courts within this district, that the IDEA’s statute of limitations
does not apply to limit the permissible period of compensatory educational
awards.’’); Robert R., 2005 WL 3003033, at *4 (concluding that a parent’s due process
claims seeking five years of compensatory education filed in June 2003 were not
barred if timely brought, and citing five additional courts in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania as having adopted the reasoning that there is ‘‘no limitations period,
whether equitable or legal, on a disabled child’s claim for compensatory education
pursuant to the IDEA’’ (quoting Amanda A. v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No.
Civ.A. 04-4184, 2005 WL 426090, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2005))). All of these cases,
however, save one decision issued in 2013, involved the issue of retroactive
application of the statute of limitations provision.
269. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 243---45 (2009).
270. See id.; see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370
(1985).
271. See, e.g., I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d
762, 774 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Other cases similarly espouse limiting compensatory
education claims to two years from the date of filing the petition, but do not provide
any support for these statements made in dicta. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696
F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012); H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822
F. Supp. 2d 439, 446---47 (D.N.J. 2011); L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch.
Dist., Nos. 06---0333, 06---3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011).
272. See, e.g., Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 250 (3d
Cir. 1999); see also M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d
Cir. 1996).
273. See Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250 .
274. See e.g., I.H., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 774; see also G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch.
Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
30, 2013).
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parent does not learn of the action until 2011 (and timely files
thereafter), the courts in Ridgewood and M.C. permit the parent to
date the compensatory education claim all the way back to 2007. In
contrast, the courts in I.H. and G.L. preclude adjudication of any
claims for violations that occurred more than two years prior to the
plaintiff’s KOSHK date (limiting the claims in this example to 2009),
and thereby deprive the student of two additional years of
compensatory education. By requiring parents to bear responsibility
for identifying a FAPE violation, the courts absolve school districts of
any and all duty to identify the failure to provide a FAPE. Hence,
courts tacitly encourage school districts not to share FAPE violations
with parents, and improperly limit the scope of compensatory claims
and awards, in contravention to seminal Third Circuit precedent.275
In light of Congress’s clarity in the IDEA’s legislative history and
relevant Third Circuit precedent, the courts clearly err in recent
decisions by barring consideration of compensatory education claims
that commenced more than two years prior to the parent’s KOSHK
date without regard to case circumstances. Perhaps the language of §
1415(b)(6)(B), together with § 1415(f)(3)(C), confused the courts
regarding the weight and effect, if any, to accord to the former
provision. Perhaps the nearly identical ‘‘knew or should have
known’’276 language that appears in both the statutes of limitation and
precedential Third Circuit opinions confounded the courts, leading
them to conclude that the accrual analysis for compensatory
education claims set forth in case precedent could not be reconciled
with the language of the IDEA 2004 (a point with which this Article
disagrees below in Part V). Notwithstanding the courts’ reasoning,
low-income children with disabilities who experience lengthy FAPE
denials suffer the consequences of courts’ erroneous interpretations
of this provision.

275. See, e.g., Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250; M.C., 81 F.3d at 396---97.
276. Any party has the opportunity to present a complaint setting forth ‘‘an alleged
violation that occurred not more than 2 years before the date the parent or public
agency knew or should have known about the alleged action that forms the basis for
the complaint . . . [subject to application of] the time line described in subsection
(f)(3)(D).’’ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2012) (emphasis added). This provision
applies to the plaintiff in the action. Id. According to Third Circuit precedent, a
child’s right to compensatory education accrues from the point that the school district
knows or should know of its failure to provide a FAPE. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 396---97;
see also Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250. Thus, the starting point for measuring the
duration of a FAPE denial and the corresponding scope of a compensatory education
claim is when the school district knows or should have known of the violation.
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Application of Equitable Tolling to the IDEA following the 2004
Amendments

In addition to the courts’ improper limitations on the consideration
and duration of compensatory education claims, the Third Circuit in
2012 further restricted the availability of compensatory education by
ending use of equitable tolling in IDEA matters.277 Equitable tolling
permits courts to postpone application of statutory limitations for a
period of time under certain circumstances.278 These doctrines
offered a means for plaintiffs to obtain lengthy compensatory
education awards that otherwise may have been barred by strict
(mis)application of the statute of limitations.279
The Third Circuit banned two equitable tolling doctrines in
particular: the continuing violations doctrine and statutory tolling for
minors.280 The continuing violations doctrine applies where a
defendant’s conduct is part of a ‘‘continuing practice.’’281 Under this
doctrine, an action is considered timely ‘‘so long as the last act
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitation period;
in such instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts
that would otherwise be time barred.’’282 Statutory tolling for minors
277. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
278. See, e.g., F.P. v. New Jersey, No. 00-2217(JWB), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25212,
at *13 (D.N.J. June 28, 2001) (finding failure to provide a FAPE over time should be
treated as an ongoing continuing practice); Jeffrey Y. v. St. Mary’s Area Sch. Dist.,
967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (permitting application of the continuing
violations doctrine to IDEA matters). But see J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13451 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2008) (limiting exceptions to those found
in the statute, thereby banning use of the continuing violations doctrine in IDEA
matters).
279. The application of equitable tolling for minors and the continuing violations
doctrine to special education cases is particularly critical for certain populations of
children, e.g., children with disabilities in foster care, who routinely do not have
someone serving as a ‘‘parent’’ to advocate on their behalves, despite surrogate
parent appointment procedures in the Act. See Daggett et al., supra note 209, at 736,
744 (discussing the critical role of parents in the special education process and
recognition by Congress and the Supreme Court that ‘‘the IDEA’s effectiveness
depends on parents’ involvement in their children’s special education, specifically
including the exercise of the procedural safeguards assigned to them on behalf of
their children’’); see also Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A New IDEA for Improving the

Education of Children with Disabilities in Foster Care: Applying Social Work
Principles to the Problem Definition Process, 26 CHILD. L. RIGHTS J. 14 (2006)
(discussing educational challenges unique to children with disabilities in foster care,
including those arising from the lack of a ‘‘parent’’ designee for special education
purposes).
280. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 254.
281. See Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 927 F.2d
1283, 1295 (3d Cir. 1991).
282. Id.
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keeps the door open to relief for young people by delaying the
application of time limits on filing until attaining the age of
eighteen.283 In the IDEA context, statutory tolling for minors created
a mechanism for young adults with disabilities, who were denied a
FAPE prior to attaining the age of majority, to assert their own rights
to compensatory education upon their eighteenth birthday.284
In assessing the use of equitable tolling post-IDEA 2004, the Third
Circuit examined the legislative history of the 2004 amendments to
the IDEA as well as the regulatory history.285 The court found the
history instructive on the question of whether equitable tolling
doctrines apply: ‘‘[T]he legislative and regulatory history of the 2004
amendments to the IDEA makes clear that only the enumerated
statutory exceptions may exempt a plaintiff from having his claims
time-barred by the statute of limitations.’’286 The court failed,
however, to examine a critical section of the Congressional Record
that distinguishes the continuing violations doctrine from other
equitable tolling doctrines.287 The section overlooked by the court
clearly expresses Congress’s intent to permit application of the
283. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-21 (West 2000) (providing that the statute of
limitations for minors tolls until the minor reaches the age of majority).
284. See, e.g., Wayne County Reg’l. Educ. Serv. Agency v. Pappas, 56 F. Supp. 2d
807 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (tolling the statute of limitations for minor with a severe
mental disability in a special education matter). But see Strawn v. Mo. State Bd. of
Educ., 210 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that tolling the statute of limitations for a
minor frustrates the purpose of the IDEA). The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Winkelman v. Parma that the IDEA affords separate and enforceable rights to
parents and children offers further support for the application of minority tolling
within the IDEA context. See 550 U.S. 516 (2007).
285. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248. Significantly, the court’s decision to examine the
legislative history of the statute of limitations for this purpose opens the door to
examining the legislative history for purposes of determining whether courts should
limit the consideration and duration of ongoing compensatory education claims that
are timely filed.
286. Id. The court quotes Senate Report NO. 108-185 as stating, ‘‘The committee
does not intend that common law determinations of statutes of limitations override
this specific directive.’’ Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40 (2003)). The court also
quotes the Federal Register as stating, ‘‘It is not necessary to clarify that common-law
directives regarding statutes of limitations should not override the Act or State
regulators timelines . . . because the Act and these regulations prescribe specific
limitation periods which superseded common law directives in this regard.’’ Id.
(quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,697 (Aug. 14, 2006)). The court fails to reconcile
these statements with Congress’s prior assertion that ‘‘where the conduct or services
at issue are ongoing to the previous two years, the claim for compensatory education
services may be made on the basis of the most recent conduct or services and the
conduct or services that were more than two years old at the time of due process or
the private placement,’’ S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40, which, some may argue, is
identical to, and supporting application of, the continuing violations doctrine.
287. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248.
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continuing violations doctrine to timely filed compensatory education
claims where such claims commenced prior to the two-years before
the KOSHK date but were ongoing to that date.288 As a result, the
court determined that plaintiffs cannot circumvent the statute of
limitations by relying on equitable tolling doctrines available under
state law.289
The Third Circuit’s elimination of equitable tolling from the IDEA
remedial repertoire ‘‘strips away the rights of children who were
subject to systemic and long-term denials of FAPE and had parents
who were not able or willing to assert their rights.’’290 Despite this
effect, the Third Circuit determined that Congress never intended for
these doctrines to ‘‘save claims otherwise foreclosed by the IDEA
statute of limitations’’ and that the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another) prevents their application.291 The court’s invocation of
expressio unius in D.K. is flawed in two critical respects. First, the
doctrine typically applies where no contrary legislative intent exists,292
while here, the legislative history of the IDEA reveals such contrary
intent.293
Second, the doctrine’s application reads otherwise
unexpressed limitations into the statute, in conflict with the Supreme
Court’s broad approach to interpreting the IDEA, including the
reading of its provisions as ‘‘elucidative rather than exhaustive.’’294
Nevertheless, the court’s invocation of expressio unius to ban
equitable tolling transformed the IDEA 2004’s two codified
exceptions to the statute of limitations into a last savior of sorts.
Unfortunately, the court’s extremely narrow interpretation of the
exceptions makes them nearly impossible to satisfy, rendering them
virtually useless for parents of children with disabilities and saving
few.

288. See S. REP. NO. 108-185, at 40.
289. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 248.
290. Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 132.
291. D.K., 696 F.3d at 248.
292. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616---17 (1980) (‘‘Where
Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of contrary legislative intent.’’).
293. See supra notes 286---88 and accompanying text.
294. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 242 (2009).
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The Third Circuit’s Interpretation of Exceptions to the Statute of
Limitations

The Third Circuit, in defining the exceptions to the IDEA 2004’s
statute of limitations, foreclosed the last remaining avenues for
children experiencing lengthy FAPE denials to obtain adequate
awards of compensatory education. As a result, the court cemented
the second-class remedial status available to children living in poverty
or low-income households under the IDEA.
In interpreting the specific misrepresentations exception, the Third
Circuit determined that plaintiffs ‘‘must show that the school
intentionally misled them or knowingly deceived them regarding their
child’s progress.’’295 The court reasoned that ‘‘in the absence of a
showing of ‘misrepresentation’ akin to intent, deceit, or egregious
misstatement, any plaintiff whose teachers first recommended
behavioral programs or instructional steps short of formal special
education might evoke the exception’’ which would essentially
‘‘swallow the rule.’’296 The court further stated that a high threshold is
necessary, for otherwise ‘‘mere optimism in reports of a student’s
progress would toll the statute.’’297
In the court’s attempt to counter one extreme------that a school
district professional’s ‘‘mere optimism’’ will successfully toll the
statute------it advanced the other extreme------that a parent must show the
misrepresentation was intentional. Demonstrating ‘‘intentionality’’
requires a plaintiff to sufficiently prove the school district personnel’s
subjective state of mind.298 Considering the fact that school districts
are both the producers and the keepers of all evidence (i.e. school
records), meeting this threshold is, at best, extremely difficult, and at
worst, an impossible feat. Following the Third Circuit’s rationale, a
child’s teacher or service provider may offer an incomplete or
inaccurate picture of a child, or gloss over a child’s failure to make
progress, as long as he can show that it was unintentional and merely
a display of hopefulness. This excessively high standard also
encourages school district personnel to base their opinions on

295. D.K., 696 F.3d at 246; see also Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist.,
No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008) (‘‘Plaintiffs must
establish not that the District’s evaluations of the student’s eligibility under IDEA
were objectively incorrect, but instead that the District subjectively determined that
the student was eligible for services under the IDEA but intentionally
misrepresented this fact to the parents.’’).
296. D.K., 696 F.3d at 24---46.
297. Id. at 245.
298. See id. at 245 (citing Evan H., 2008 WL 4791634, at *6 n.3).
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subjective measures of progress, as opposed to objective ones.
Without objective measures, a parent cannot challenge the
subjectivity of a district’s opinions.
With regard to the withholding of information exception, the court
held that ‘‘only the failure to supply statutorily mandated disclosures
can toll the statute of limitations,’’ and thus parents must show that a
school district ‘‘failed to provide them with a written notice,
explanation, or form specifically required by the IDEA statutes and
regulations.’’299 As a result, a school district’s withholding of
substantive information------e.g., available programs, the student’s
educational progress, teacher observations, and reports------does not
satisfy the rule.
In addition to showing that the school district knowingly or
intentionally misled the parent about the child’s progress, or that the
district failed to provide the parent with the procedural safeguards or
required notices, the parent must show causation. Specifically, the
parent must prove ‘‘that the misrepresentations or withholding caused
his failure to request a hearing or filing a complaint on time.’’300
Failure to do so results in denial of the exceptions.
In comparing the Third Circuit’s interpretation of and approach to
the IDEA’s remedial scheme pre and post-IDEA 2004, the 180degree shift becomes clear. The court’s prior tendency to broadly
construe the statute in favor of parents and children with disabilities
has transformed into a constriction of rights and remedies at the
expense of the very same children the Act aims to protect. Children
with disabilities whose families are socioeconomically disadvantaged
have no choice in remedies and pay the price.
IV. APPLICATION OF THIRD CIRCUIT COURTS’ OPINIONS TO
CASE STUDIES
To illustrate the adverse effects of these decisions, this Article
applies some of the Third Circuit’s recent positions on the statute of
limitations to two anecdotal case studies301 from the Education and
Health Law Clinic at Rutgers University School of Law-Newark
(formerly known as the Special Education Clinic). 302 The Education

299. Id. at 246.
300. Id.
301. Client names, identifying information, and certain case facts have been
changed to protect client privacy and preserve confidentiality.
302. The Education and Health Law Clinic provides free legal representation to
indigent parents of children with disabilities (and adult students) in special education,
early intervention, and school discipline matters. In addition, through a new medical-
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and Health Law Clinic represented Aaron, an adult student, and the
mother of Asia, a minor child, in their special education matters.
These two cases represent a microcosm of thousands that go
unheard303 due to many reasons, including parents’ lack of knowledge
and awareness of available programs and services, eligibility
requirements, their rights and those of their children, as well as lack
of ability, confidence, and/or outside assistance in asserting their
rights.304
A. The Case of Aaron
Consider first the case of Aaron, a nineteen-year-old male student
with severe language and learning disabilities. Aaron sought help
from the Clinic because he was nearing graduation and wanted to
learn how to read. He found the Clinic with the help of a former
public school teacher who had taken Aaron under her wing and tried
to advocate on his behalf with the school district to obtain additional
special education supports and services. When the former teacher

legal-social work partnership known as the H.E.A.L. (Health, Education, Advocacy
and Law) Collaborative with the Rutgers-N.J. Medical School’s Outpatient Pediatrics
Department, students in law and social work partner with medical professionals to
address the legal and social needs of pediatric patients with disabilities and their
families in an effort to improve overall child and family health and well-being.
Demographically, the Clinic’s client population is comprised of parents and adult
students who are predominantly African-American and Latino; some are new
immigrants and speak limited or no English, whereas others have lived in the same
urban poor communities for generations. They are mostly female, and may be
mothers, grandmothers, great-grandmothers, or aunts. They frequently have their
own histories of disabilities and/or current health concerns. They have little to no
money, as few are employed, and all have household incomes falling at or below
150% of the federal poverty level, currently $35,325 per year for a family of four.
They may face hunger and poor nutrition, deplorable housing conditions or
homelessness, and may be forced to choose between paying for gas, electricity, food,
or transportation on any given day. For more information on the Rutgers School of
Law Newark Education and Health Law Clinic, see Education and Health Law
Clinic, RUTGERS SCH. L.------NEWARK, http://law.newark.rutgers.edu/clinics/specialeducation-clinic (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
303. Other examples of case studies from the Education and Health Law Clinic
involve children who are ‘‘suspended indefinitely’’ due to unaddressed emotional and
behavioral disabilities; children who are profoundly deaf and have no verbal
language, taught by teachers who know no sign language, and yelled at for not
listening; children who are mislabeled and treated for attention deficit disorder and
behavior problems when they actually suffer from severe auditory processing
disabilities; children denied vision modifications or Braille instruction despite
minimal light perception and legal blindness; or children placed on home instruction
because no one at the school wants to take responsibility for maintaining their
feeding tubes or administering seizure medications by injection.
304. See generally supra Part I.
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reached a roadblock in her advocacy efforts, she contacted the Clinic
for assistance.
Aaron lived in a poor neighborhood in New Jersey. He was a firstgeneration American, and his parents, now divorced, immigrated to
the United States from the Dominican Republic shortly before his
birth. His primary language at home is Spanish. Although he lived at
home with his mother and stepfather, his relationships with family
members, except his younger brother, were so strained that he asked
that all correspondence be sent to an alternate address. Aaron’s
mother and stepfather provided him with food and shelter; he paid
for other expenses such as his cell phone and transportation by
holding an after-school job stocking shelves.
Aaron told the Clinic that he had received special education help
all through his schooling, but could not name his classification or the
services or programming he received. When asked if his mother
might know this information, he shook his head and explained that
she spoke limited English, had a fifth grade education, and tended to
sign papers without understanding them. Aaron further described his
father as ‘‘out of the picture’’ and remarked that his stepfather had
nothing to do with his upbringing or schooling.
Aaron characterized his greatest concerns as his difficulty
understanding others when they talk and his inability to read. School
records provided by his teacher/advocate indicated that he was
classified as Multiply Disabled305 due to unspecified specific learning
disabilities306 and a communication impairment.307 Despite the
IDEA’s requirement that students with disabilities be reevaluated for
eligibility every three years,308 the school district had not evaluated
Aaron since age thirteen. Prior testing indicated that when he was in
305. Under New Jersey Special Education Regulations, ‘‘multiply disabled’’ is
defined as the ‘‘presence of two or more disabling conditions, the combination of
which causes such severe educational needs that they cannot be accommodated in a
program designed solely to address one of the impairments.’’ N.J. ADMIN. CODE §
6A:14-3.5(c)(6) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2013).
306. New Jersey Special Education Regulations define ‘‘specific learning disability’’
as, ‘‘a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or using language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in an
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical
calculations, including conditions such as perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal
brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia.’’ N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:143.5(c)(12).
307. New Jersey Special Education Regulations define ‘‘communication
impairment’’ as a disorder of language in the areas of ‘‘morphology, syntax, semantics
and/or pragmatics/discourse’’ adversely affecting the student’s educational
performance. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-3.5(c)(4).
308. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:14-3.8(a) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2013).
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the seventh grade, he read at a first grade level; however, more recent
teacher reports placed his reading abilities at a third or fourth grade
level.
The Clinic immediately requested, and the school district agreed to
provide, independent evaluations in the areas of speech and language,
auditory processing, and reading as well as educational and
psychological testing. Results indicated that Aaron had a low average
to near borderline IQ, a severe auditory processing disorder,309 a
severe expressive and receptive language disorder,310 and a reading
disability. He performed at a second to third grade level in testing in
most subjects, with the exception of reading, in which he performed at
a first grade level. A review of Aaron’s school records obtained from
the district revealed, among other concerns, IEP goals and objectives
that had been cut and pasted from one year to the next with no
indicia of progress; unexplained termination of speech and language
services when he was ten years old; failure to provide specialized
reading instruction to address his decoding disability; and no
accommodations, modifications, or assistive technology to assist
Aaron with his auditory processing deficits.
On Aaron’s behalf, the Clinic attended an IEP meeting with the
school district to discuss his concerns. When the district refused to
address them, the Clinic filed a petition for a due process hearing311 on
Aaron’s behalf; as a nineteen-year-old, Aaron had the right to sue on
his own, and satisfied the statute of limitations by filing his complaint
within two years of his eighteenth birthday, the earliest time at which
he could be deemed to ‘‘know or should have known’’ of the action
forming the basis of his complaint.312 Over the next six months, the

309. An ‘‘auditory processing disorder’’ is a ‘‘difficulty in the perceptual processing
of auditory information in the central nervous system’’ (i.e., dysfunction in the way
the brain processes auditory information as opposed to deafness or hearing
impairment that concern how one hears information), resulting in language and
learning difficulties. See (Central) Auditory Processing Disorders AM. SPEECHLANGUAGE-HEARING ASSOCIATION, http://www.asha.org/docs/html/tr2005-00043.
html#sec1.3 (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
310. An ‘‘expressive language’’ disorder is characterized by difficulties with the
expression of language, including the sharing of thoughts, emotions, and ideas,
whereas a ‘‘receptive language disorder’’ is characterized by difficulty understanding
others. See Speech and Language Disorders and Diseases, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGEHEARING ASSOCIATION, http://www.asha.org/public/speech/disorders (last visited
Dec. 18, 2013).
311. See supra note 123 (detailing a ‘‘due process hearing’’).
312. Following Third Circuit courts’ definition of the ‘‘action forming the basis of
the complaint,’’ Aaron’s KOSHK date likely would have been found as the date he
received the results of the independent evaluations and learned of the injury. See
generally supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Clinic engaged in active negotiations with the district to obtain a new
educational program and an acceptable compensatory education
settlement. For leverage, the Clinic used the district’s nine-plus year
failure to identify the denial of a FAPE and failure to provide
appropriate programming and services to Aaron (using the date on
which the district terminated speech and language services as the
accrual date for the compensatory education claim). Additionally, the
Clinic relied on New Jersey’s tolling provision for minors, which
allowed the time limit for filing a complaint to be tolled until Aaron
reached the age of majority, and the continuing violations doctrine,
which permitted Aaron to date his claim back for multiple years
during which the district’s conduct was ongoing. The Clinic also
couched its legal argument in the Third Circuit’s broad interpretation
of the remedial scheme, especially as it applied to the remedy of
compensatory education, evidenced in case precedent.313
In the end, the parties settled, without litigation, on six years of
extensive compensatory education and related services for Aaron.
These services included a specialized reading program provided oneon-one by a certified reading specialist up to four times per week,
weekly individualized speech and language therapy, daily basic skills
instruction taught one-on-one by a certified special education teacher,
up to four years of college or post-high school vocational
programming of his choosing at the district’s expense (including the
cost of all materials, transportation, and other fees), assistive
technology, and more. Despite the extensive settlement Aaron
received, based on research, no amount of compensatory education
could ever place him into the position he would have been in had the
district provided Aaron with proper programming and services all
along. To date, Aaron has advanced to a near fifth grade level in
math, a near sixth grade level in reading, completed a trade school
program of his choosing (at the district’s expense), and obtained the
necessary certification to practice his new vocation.
Had Aaron’s case occurred today, the result would have differed
greatly. Aaron would have received two years of compensatory
education programming and services following the courts’ language in
H.M.,314 L.G.,315 and D.K.,316 or between three and four years

313. See generally supra Part II.B.
314. See H.M. ex rel. B.M. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ., 822 F. Supp. 2d 439,
446---47 (D.N.J. 2011).
315. See L.G. & E.G. ex rel. E.G. v. Wissahickon Sch. Dist., Nos. 06---0333, 06--3816, 2011 WL 13572, at *7 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011).
316. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012).
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following ‘‘2+2’’ analysis.317 Aaron likely would have stopped
receiving his regular (non-compensatory) special education
programming during the year he turned twenty-one, and would have
exited from the special education system with a third to fourth grade
reading level and high third grade math level at most.318 Based on
these levels, he likely would not have been able to understand his
teachers’ oral instructions in the vocational program, or been able to
read and understand the materials needed to complete the program
and obtain his certification. Aaron probably would have ended up
another poverty statistic, as opposed to an employed, contributing
member of society. While one may try to minimize the significance of
Aaron’s case by arguing that it is merely an anomaly, from my years
of experience in the field, I can say that I have seen similar facts in at
least ten percent of my cases. Moreover, for every case that the Clinic
accepts, there are countless others that never see the light of day.
B.

The Case of Asia

Asia’s situation differed greatly from Aaron’s, but also is not
uncommon. Her mother, Ms. Jones, first approached the Clinic when
Asia was a twelve-year-old, sixth grade student in an urban public
school. When we met, Ms. Jones said that she knew ‘‘in her bones’’
that Asia was not receiving the educational programming and services
she needed, but could not articulate why she felt that way. Ms. Jones
confided that she had trusted the school district for nearly six years,
believing teachers and staff when they said Asia was receiving the
non-special education supports she needed. She admitted that, until
recently, she did not know that she could ‘‘go after’’ the school district
for refusing to educate Asia properly. When asked if she ever
received a copy of her special education rights from the district (i.e.
procedural safeguards), she said she recalled receiving a booklet but
did not understand much of what it said.
Asia’s early history was significant. Her biological mother was a
drug addict and had received no prenatal care. Asia was born seven
weeks premature, with crack-cocaine in her system. She experienced
withdrawal symptoms following birth and spent her first eight weeks
in the neonatal intensive care unit. Ms. Jones, at age sixty, adopted
Asia at age two. Over the years, doctors diagnosed Asia with

317. See G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 180923, at *10---11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013).
318. These numbers are extrapolated from Aaron’s performance and progress
reports following receipt of compensatory education and related services.
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Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder319, Bipolar Disorder320, and
Oppositional Defiant Disorder.321 Her behaviors and moods ranged
widely, from calm and kind to manic episodes during which she
engaged in uncontrolled fits of crying and screaming and, at times,
destroyed property. Doctors had not yet been able to determine the
appropriate mix of pharmaceutical and therapeutic interventions to
help her.
Ms. Jones first requested help for Asia from the school district
when she was six years old due to her out-of-control behaviors both at
school and at home. The school district had contacted Ms. Jones
often over the years for Asia’s misbehavior, and alternated between
suspending Asia and requiring that Ms. Jones accompany Asia to
school and sit next to her in the classroom for weeks on end to ensure
that she behaved. However, the district never put the suspension
notices in writing. Later, when the Clinic asked about the district
requiring Ms. Jones to accompany Asia to school, the district
responded that Ms. Jones did so voluntarily and at her own initiative.
The district rejected Ms. Jones’ initial request for non-specific help
on the grounds that the timing of the request fell at the end of the
school year and no teacher had expressed concerns about Asia. At
the end of the following school year, when Asia was seven, Ms. Jones
again asked for help, but the district told her that since Asia’s
problems were behavioral in nature, there was nothing they could do.
Instead, they advised Ms. Jones to get Asia therapy outside of school,
to which Ms. Jones agreed.
During this time, Ms. Jones lost her job due to the numerous calls
she received from Asia’s school during work hours and missed days
resulting from accompanying Asia to school or removing Asia from
school at the district’s behest. In the months that followed, Ms. Jones’
own health began to deteriorate------she became depressed and gained

319. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a chronic condition
affecting one’s ability to sustain attention and resulting in hyperactivity and impulsive
behavior. See Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in Children, MAYO
CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/adhd/DS00275 (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
320. Bipolar disorder, formerly known as manic depression, is a mental illness that
is characterized by episodic high and low moods. See Bipolar Disorder, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/bipolar-disorder/mental-health-bipolar-disorder (last visited
Dec. 18, 2013).
321. Oppositional Defiant Disorder is ‘‘a condition in which a child displays an
ongoing pattern of uncooperative, defiant, hostile, and annoying behavior toward
people in authority. The child’s behavior often disrupts the child’s normal daily
activities, including activities within the family and at school.’’ Oppositional Defiant
Disorder, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/oppositional-defiantdisorder (last visited Dec. 18, 2013).
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weight, thus aggravating her diabetes, and she developed high blood
pressure and other health-related concerns. These health concerns
impacted her ability to find employment, and she soon found herself
in debt and in danger of eviction. She began relying on public
assistance, including SSI for Asia and food stamps to pay for their
basic needs. They were forced to move, resulting in an inter-district
change of schools for Asia.
At the new school, when Asia was ten, Ms. Jones asked for help
again. This time, she was sent to the school’s Intervention and
Referral Services (I&RS) team to discuss possible interventions. The
I&RS team met with Ms. Jones and they agreed to try different
behavioral interventions, including a point system, to rectify the
behaviors. Six months passed with no change, so Ms. Jones and the
I&RS team together referred Asia for a special education (child study
team) evaluation. A meeting was held, at which time members of the
district’s special education department informed Ms. Jones that they
would not evaluate Asia because the I&RS interventions had not
been implemented fully and the I&RS documentation was
incomplete. At the same time, the district assured Ms. Jones that
I&RS was resolving the problem behaviors and there was no need for
special education assistance. Over the next eighteen months, Ms.
Jones bounced back and forth between the I&RS team and the child
study team as she tried to work with them and do what they asked
and instructed her to do, to no avail. She contacted the Clinic for
help after learning about us from Asia’s therapist in the after-school
behavioral program.
Within two months of the Clinic’s involvement, the district, at the
Clinic’s urging, completed an expedited evaluation of Asia and found
her eligible for special education and related services. Testing
revealed that Asia, then twelve years old, had an average to low
average IQ, but was performing academically at approximately a
third grade level across the board. Shortly before a meeting with the
school district to determine Asia’s eligibility for special education, she
was hospitalized in an inpatient psychiatric unit due to ‘‘explosive’’
behavior. A dispute then arose between the district and Ms. Jones
over the proper classification for Asia, which further delayed the
eligibility process for another two months. When the parties finally
agreed to a classification, the school district developed an IEP that
proposed placement at another public school in the same town------the
same one Asia had attended previously. Ms. Jones refused to agree
to the IEP because she felt that this school could not address Asia’s
needs appropriately.
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The Clinic, on behalf of Ms. Jones, then filed a request for a due
process hearing against the school district. The petition asked for
Asia’s immediate placement in a private school specializing in
educating children with severe emotional and behavioral problems,
and compensatory education and related services due to the district’s
failure to identify, evaluate, classify, and provide Asia with proper
educational programming and services over a six-year period. Shortly
thereafter, Asia was again admitted to the crisis unit at the local
hospital. This time, the state’s behavioral health program stepped her
down into a residential program, where Asia remains to this day.
The parties ultimately settled Asia’s case without having to
proceed to a hearing. During negotiations, the Clinic relied on Third
Circuit precedent placing the duty to identify the denial of a FAPE on
school districts and the courts’ authority to award broad relief in the
area of compensatory education where the violation was ongoing.
The Clinic also relied on the exceptions to the statute of limitations
provision to justify Ms. Jones’s failure to file for due process earlier.
First, the Clinic argued that that the child study team’s repeated
assertions that I&RS interventions were properly addressing Asia’s
behavior problems induced Ms. Jones to trust that the district was
providing Asia with the educational supports and services she
required. Second, the Clinic asserted that the district withheld
necessary information from Ms. Jones about Asia’s failure to make
educational progress and her non-responsiveness to I&RS
interventions.
The parties ultimately agreed to a substantial
compensatory education settlement allowing Asia to access additional
educational programming and services up to and beyond age twentyone.
Just as with Aaron’s case, had Asia’s matter arisen today, the
settlement size would have been vastly reduced. Earlier Third Circuit
precedent and the exceptions to the statute of limitations served as
valuable, essential bargaining chips for the Clinic in negotiating the
settlement’s terms. Although one cannot predict the future, it
appears that no matter the breadth of the compensatory education
award, Asia will not be put in the same position in which she would
have been had the school district properly identified and addressed
her behavioral concerns and their adverse impact on her education
from the outset. However, the Third Circuit’s recent restrictions on
the availability of compensatory education as a remedy would have
hurt her even more.
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V. REMEDYING INEQUALITIES IN THE REMEDIAL SCHEME
Courts in the Third Circuit, through misreading, misstatements,
misapplication, and restrictive interpretation of the statute of
limitations, its exceptions, and the procedural safeguards have
fortified the second-class status of the IDEA remedial scheme for
children from low-income households. The question of how to
address this issue remains. The statistics presented in Part I
demonstrate that the proper education of children with disabilities in
low-income households is a complex issue requiring a multi-faceted
response. Moreover, as stated previously, significant efforts must be
made to cure the ills at the front end of the system for, until this
occurs, the disheartening outcomes will not change. In the interim,
however, we must strengthen available remedies for low-income
children with disabilities denied a FAPE. To this end, I have several
recommendations.
First and foremost, Congress must codify the remedy of
compensatory education in the next reauthorization322 of the Act. 323
Without such codification, school districts have no duty to notify the
public of the remedy’s availability, which results in the denial of
essential information to an entire class of people for whom
compensatory education and related services is the only form of
recompense. Congress’s continuing failure to codify compensatory
education and to delineate parameters for accessing, interpreting, and
applying the remedy, has reinforced the remedy’s status as a secondclass cure.324
To illustrate, by including tuition reimbursement in the Act,
Congress set forth the right to the remedy as well as the limitations on
accessing and enforcing it. In this manner, Congress protects both
parents and school districts.
Parents must abide by notice

322. The IDEA originally was scheduled for reauthorization in 2011 but the
process has been postponed to at least 2014. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N,
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITY EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): EARLY PREPARATION FOR
REAUTHORIZATION (2013), available at http://www.nsba.org/Advocacy/Key-Issues/
SpecialEducation/NSBA-Issue-Brief-Individuals-with-Disabilities-Education-ActIDEA.pdf.
323. See Hyman et al. supra note 92, at 156 (recommending codification of
compensatory education as a remedy in the statute to ensure that parents without
means are aware of this remedial option).
324. One may posit that since compensatory education is an equitable remedy, it
need not be codified as it falls under the IDEA’s broad remedial relief. However, the
same may be said about tuition reimbursement, also an equitable remedy, yet
codified within the Act. Perhaps the distinction exists because those who can afford
to unilaterally place children in private schools have a louder voice in Congress than
those who cannot front the costs, but that topic is outside the purview of this Article.
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requirements and behave reasonably or else risk reduction or denial
of reimbursement. Similarly, school districts are on notice that
parents know of the remedy and will use it when they are financially
able. Codification of tuition reimbursement serves as a valuable
deterrent by placing school districts, particularly those in communities
where parents can afford to ‘‘front’’ the costs of programs and
services, on notice of substantial financial risk in the event they fail to
provide a FAPE. The IDEA also details certain instances where a
court must or may be prevented from reducing or denying a tuition
reimbursement claim,325 thereby adding an additional level of
protection to parents who invoke the remedy.
In contrast, the Act affords parents no notice of the availability of
compensatory education as a remedy, nor does it offer parents
seeking this remedy any additional protections. Yet, the IDEA does
impose requirements on parents for accessing and using the remedy.
By applying the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations provision to
compensatory education claims, Congress sets rules on how to
request a form of relief, and limits access to the relief without
informing the public of the remedy’s availability or providing any
guidance regarding what it is and how to obtain it. In essence,
Congress limits the remedy without stating it exists, which is akin to
putting the proverbial cart before the horse. One easily can see how
this might result in children being denied the full benefit of the
remedy due to a parent’s failure to invoke the remedy within required
timelines.
In addition to codifying the remedy of compensatory education,
Congress should create a separate statute of limitations for these
claims. The current two-year statute of limitations on tuition
reimbursement claims makes sense. Logic dictates that parents
should give school districts proper notice of their intent to unilaterally
place their child and seek reimbursement, and two years is ample
time for them to file for reimbursement from the district. Clearly,
parents know when they unilaterally place their children in private
school. Thus, the ‘‘should have known’’ language of the provision has
limited or no application to tuition reimbursement claims. Moreover,
parents who are able to bear the costs of educational programs and

325. See 20 USC §1412(a)(10)(C) (2012) (e.g., where a school district prevents a
parent from providing required notice or parents do not receive notice/procedural
safeguards from the school district). Courts also may choose not to reduce or deny
reimbursement where a parent is illiterate, cannot write in English, or compliance
with notice requirements would have resulted in serious emotional harm to the child.

See id.
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services typically are financially stable, better educated, and more
capable of understanding the IDEA’s procedural safeguards.326 These
factors, coupled with the presumption that parents who unilaterally
place their children in private school are more able to access and pay
for legal assistance, make the two-year limitations period even more
reasonable. In contrast, as stated earlier, approximately two-thirds of
children with disabilities live in households that qualify as (or are just
over) low-income and are at high risk of experiencing the myriad
harmful effects of the correlation between low socioeconomic status,
disability and poor educational outcomes.327 These are the same
children for whom compensatory education is the sole available
remedy for the denial of a FAPE. They are more likely to reside in
single-parent households,328 and suffer the ill effects of power
imbalances between their parents and their school districts resulting
from differences in educational attainment, knowledge base, language
and access to legal or other expert assistance.329 To impose a flat twoyear limitation on these parents when filing for compensatory
education, without informing them of the remedy and offering an
opportunity for courts to consider the factors discussed in Part I that
influence parents’ ability to access the remedy and advocate, is to
deprive them of adequate, equal recourse.
In creating the statute of limitations for compensatory education
claims, Congress should set a time limit that offers both a bright line
rule to protect school districts and flexibility to protect parents of
children with disabilities and adult students. To accomplish this task,
this Article proposes that Congress establish a two-year statute of
limitations for the filing of compensatory education claims triggered

solely by the date the parent knows of the alleged action that forms
the basis of the complaint.330 In so doing, Congress could include a

326. See generally supra Part I.
327. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 11.
328. See Bradshaw, supra note 30; see also Fujiura & Yamaki, supra note 69.
329. See generally supra Part I.D.
330. Courts in the Third Circuit do not appear to have struggled with identifying
the point at which a parent ‘‘knew’’ of the conduct, as in some cases parents and
school districts agree on this date, and in others courts have defined the date as when
the parent obtained legal representation or obtained the results of an independent
evaluation that revealed a contrary view than that espoused by the District. See, e.g.,
I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 774 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (finding that the ‘‘knew or should have known date’’ for requesting a hearing
was the date the guardian learned, from independent evaluations, that the child was
not receiving proper educational services); see also Lauren G. v. W. Chester Area
Sch. Dist., 906 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that parents knew of
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rebuttable presumption of knowledge in certain situations, which
parents could produce evidence to overcome, to avoid the potential
for needless litigation over the rule’s application. Examples of such
situations include where a parent retained the assistance of legal
counsel for the explicit purpose of pursuing a case against the school
district for the denial of a FAPE, or a parent obtained the results of
independent evaluation reports indicating that the child’s current
special education programming and services are not appropriate.331
Elimination of the ‘‘should have known’’ requirement coincides with
the minimal (to non-) use of that triggering language in the tuition
reimbursement context. Moreover, until the courts succeed in
developing a ‘‘reasonable person standard’’ that applies to parents of
low-income children with disabilities and incorporates those factors
discussed in Part I, courts should refrain from making any
determination of whether a parent ‘‘should have known’’ of the
alleged action or violation.
The inclusion of a new exception exempting from the time limit
parents who know of the action forming the basis of the complaint,
but demonstrate that circumstances otherwise impeded timely filing,
is critical to this proposed statute of limitations. To this end,
Congress should mandate the development of uniform regulations
that provide a non-exhaustive list of factors a court may consider in
determining whether this new exception applies to a particular case.
Factors should include a parent’s socioeconomic status, level of
educational attainment, disability and health status, literacy and
comprehension levels, native language issues, cultural norms (e.g. in
certain cultures, teachers are given the utmost respect and their
opinions are not challenged), access to outside expertise and legal
representation, and the readability of the procedural safeguards, to
name a few. Congress should instruct courts to conduct an
individualized inquiry into the application of this exception, including
the parent’s unique factual circumstances, just as courts do in
determining the appropriateness of a child’s IEP. This exception to
the rule is essential to protect children where a parent, due to
circumstances beyond his control, is unable to file in a timely fashion.
In addition to this exception, Congress should extend application of
the IDEA 2004’s statute of limitations’ exceptions to compensatory
education claims, but issue guidance on defining and applying the

injury at or about the time they removed their child from school and retained legal
counsel for purposes of determining if the special education harm was actionable).
331. See, e.g., id.
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exceptions to avoid and overcome the Third Circuit’s excessively
restrictive interpretation.
Once Congress codifies the remedy of compensatory education in
the IDEA, the proposed separate statute of limitations, and
exceptions, it must safeguard the scope of this remedy from
restriction, provided a complaint is timely filed. In other words,
Congress should include its intent (which was consistent with prior
Third Circuit precedent) within the language of the IDEA proper.
Specifically, the IDEA should be amended to permit consideration of
compensatory education claims that occurred more than two years
before the KOSHK date, but were ongoing to the two-year period
prior to that date, as long as such claims are filed in accordance with
time limits. Congress also should expressly permit the use of
equitable tolling, including the continuing violations doctrine (in
accordance with the legislative history) and statutory tolling for
minors.
Disallowing consideration of ongoing compensatory
education claims and the use of statutory tolling for minors penalizes
children with disabilities for their parent’s circumstances in
contravention to Third Circuit precedent.332 It perpetuates the vicious
cycle of poor statistical outcomes for low-income children with
disabilities and provides a green light to school districts to deny
children a FAPE because of the unlikelihood they will be challenged
for so doing, and the small amount of recompense they will have to
provide (at most, two years) if such challenge succeeds. 333
Finally, as we await the reauthorization process to make the abovedescribed changes to the statute, Third Circuit courts should
reexamine recent opinions applying the IDEA 2004 statute of
limitations to compensatory education matters and interpreting the
exceptions together with the Act’s legislative history and Third
Circuit precedent. In the coming months, the Third Circuit will have

332. See, e.g., M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir.
1996). (‘‘[A] child’s entitlement to special education should not depend upon the
vigilance of the parents . . . .’’).
333. School districts likely will argue that the flexibility provided in the proposed
statute of limitations will open the door to excessive litigation and expose school
districts to tremendous costs. In reality, however, fewer than one percent of students
receiving IDEA services participated in full hearings in 2008---2009, and considering
the issues discussed in Part I, it is highly unlikely that these numbers will change
greatly in the near future without significant changes in these circumstances. See
Hyman et al., supra note 92, at 120 (noting that only 2033 of the nearly seven million
children receiving special education services through Parts B and C of the IDEA
actually participated in full hearings leading to a final decision in 2008---2009, yet
politicians and policy makers focus most on the alleged ‘‘cost’’ of due process); see
also Bagenstos, supra note 132.
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opportunity to examine the interrelationship of 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(C) and § 1415(b)(6)(B), thanks to the G.L. court’s
certification of the issue for interlocutory appeal.334 In ruling on these
issues, the courts should reconcile the language of the provisions, the
guiding principles set forth in the statute, the legislative history, and
Third Circuit precedent.
First, the courts should properly apply the two-year timeline for
filing a complaint, set forth in § 1415(f)(3)(C), to the filing party’s
KOSHK date in accordance with the language of the provision.
Second, courts should read § 1415(b)(6) to mean that if an alleged
denial of a FAPE both started and ended more than two years before
the KOSHK date, and the court finds that the parent knew or should
have known of the alleged action forming the basis of the complaint,
then the claim is barred. If the parent did not know (or should not
have known) of the action, or if the claim occurred more than two
years before the KOSHK date but was ongoing to the prior two years,
then the claim should be considered in its entirety.
This
interpretation is consistent with both the language of the IDEA and
the legislative history. Some may argue that this interpretation is
simply an application of the continuing violations doctrine in disguise,
and perhaps it is. By the same token, the Third Circuit should not
have eliminated this doctrine through its ban on the use of equitable
tolling because, in so doing, the court contradicted the stated intent of
the legislators.
Third, the language of M.C. and Ridgewood determining the
accrual of a compensatory education claim as the date the school
district knew or should have known of the denial of a FAPE remains
good law. It does not conflict with either the language of IDEA 2004
or the Act’s legislative history. As explained earlier, placement of the
duty to identify the denial of a FAPE solely on school districts
coincides with the Act’s requirement that school districts have the
affirmative duty to identify, evaluate and provide a FAPE to eligible
children. The statute of limitations’ requirement that a parent or
school district file a complaint within two years of the KOSHK date
has no effect on the compensatory education accrual date. In other
words, while the statute of limitations applies to the timeframe for
filing the complaint, it should not be applied to determine the starting
point for measuring a compensatory education claim or to limit
consideration of the scope of a claim as long as the claim is timely
334. Order Including Certification Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), G.L. v.
Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 2:13-cv-00034, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180923
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2013), ECF No. 56.
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filed. The court should adhere to case precedent on this point, and
cease its misapplication of the statute of limitations in compensatory
education matters.
CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s dramatic shift in its approach to compensatory
education claims has significantly restricted access to an essential
remedy for children with disabilities in low-income households, and
removed a critical deterrent for school districts to comply with the
IDEA’s mandates. The proposed recommendations ask Congress to
follow the lessons of early Third Circuit precedent in amending the
IDEA’s remedial scheme, and align with the articulated findings and
purposes of the Act. The plights of and poor outcomes for children
with disabilities in low-income households coupled with principles of
fundamental fairness dictate that Congress and the courts interpret
and apply the remedy of compensatory education broadly while
balancing the equities in applying a statute of limitations to such
claims. To do otherwise will serve only to perpetuate inequality for
those living in poverty, and encourage school districts to hedge their
bets in determining whether to provide a FAPE, to the detriment of
too many voiceless children, their families, and society at large.

